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A decision-maker is utility-sophisticated if he ranks acts according to their expected
utility whenever such comparisons are meaningful. We characterize utility sophistica-
tion in cases in which probabilistic beliefs are not too imprecise, and show that in these
cases utility-sophisticated preferences are completely determined by consequence util-
ities and event attitudes captured by preferences over bets. The Anscombe-Aumann
framework as employed in the classical contributions of Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa-
Schmeidler (1989) can be viewed as an important special case. For the class of utility
sophisticated preferences with suﬃciently precise beliefs, we also propose a deﬁnition
of revealed probabilistic beliefs that overcomes the limitations of existing deﬁnitions.
Keywords: expected utility, ambiguity, probabilistic sophistication, revealed prob-
abilistic beliefs.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D811. INTRODUCTION
Expected tility theory rests on two pillars of consequentialist rationality: the
existence of a unique subjective probability measure underlying all decisions (the
“Bayes principle”), and the consistent valuation of outcomes by cardinal utilities (the
“Bernoulli principle”). Both of these assumptions have been challenged. On the one
hand, as illustrated by the Ellsberg paradox, it is frequently not possible to represent
a decision-maker’s betting preferences in terms of a well-deﬁned subjective probability
measure; in such cases, decision-makers are said to view certain events as “ambigu-
ous”. On the other hand, faced with given probabilities, utilities and probabilities
may not combine linearly, as in the Allais paradox and related phenomena; such
decision-makers are sometimes referred to as exhibiting “probabilistic risk-attitudes”.
While a descriptively fully adequate model of decision-making will need to incor-
porate both phenomena, for modelling purposes it is often desirable to zoom in on
one of these two departures from the expected utility paradigm. To this purpose,
Machina-Schmeidler (1992) have introduced the notion of probabilistic sophistica-
tion which precludes all phenomena of ambiguity but does not constrain the nature
of probabilistic risk-attitudes. In the present paper, we introduce a complementary
notion of utility sophistication which precludes all phenomena deriving from proba-
bilistic risk-attitudes but does not constrain the decision-maker’s attitudes towards
ambiguity.
Besides this analytical motivation, the notion of utility sophistication has also an
important normative purpose. Since the underlying Bernoulli principle is conceptually
clearly distinct from the Bayes principle, one can formulate a normative position on
which departures from the Bayes principle are rationally justiﬁable while departures
from the Bernoulli principle are not. Such a position seems in fact quite attractive.
On the one hand, it can be doubted that the precision of beliefs required by the Bayes
1principle is normatively mandated; indeed ,i tc a ne v e nb ea r g u e dt h a ti ns i t u a t i o n s
of partial or complete ignorance rational decision making cannot rationally be based
well-deﬁned subjective probabilities (see the classical literature on complete ignorance
surveyed in Luce-Raiﬀa (1957) as well the subsequent contributions of Jaﬀray (1989)
and Nehring (1991,2000)). On the other hand, while it is frequently argued that de-
partures from the Bernoulli principle are rationally permissible, we are not aware of an
argument that would rationally mandate departures from the Bernoulli principle, i.e.
in particular, departures from expected utility in the presence of probabilities. More-
over, the typical examples of departures from the Bernoulli principle such as the Allais
paradox can be interpreted as “real but not rational”, by attributing them to cogni-
tive distortions in the processing of probabilities as in Kahneman-Tversky’s (1979)
prospect theory, or as “rational but merely apparent”, by appealing to the existence
of implicit psychological payoﬀs (cf. for example Broome (1991) and Caplin-Leahy
(2001)). The present paper articulates this normative “Bernoulli without Bayes”
position axiomatically but will not defend it further.
Broadly speaking, we shall view an agent as “utility-sophisticated” if he compares
acts in terms of their expected utility “whenever possible”. Importantly, since the
possibility of such comparisons depends on the agents’ beliefs, utility sophistication
must be deﬁned relative t oas p e c i ﬁed set of probabilistic beliefs (at least initially).
We shall thus model probabilistic beliefs as a separate entity, speciﬁcally as partial
orderings over events (likelihood relations) represented by a (closed convex) set of
admissible probability measures Π.T h e s p e c i ﬁed likelihood relation will be viewed
as describing non-exhaustively some but not necessarily all of the decision maker’s
beliefs; the leading example of such beliefs derives from the existence of a continu-
ous randomization device as implicit in the Anscombe-Aumann (1963) approach to
decision making under uncertainty.
2Given a cardinal utility functionu (obtained from risk preferences), an agent is
utility-sophisticated with respect to the set of admissible priors Π if the agent prefers
any act f over another act g whenever the expected utility of f weakly exceeds
that of g with respect to any admissible prior. Utility sophistication implies expected
utility maximization over unambiguous acts (acts whose induced distribution does not
depend on the prior), but is substantially stronger since it also restricts preferences
over ambiguous acts. This added strength proves crucial for its analytical power.
The ﬁrst and foremost task of the paper is to provide axiomatic foundations.
The crucial axiom replacing Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle is an axiom of “Trade-oﬀ
Consistency”.1 The main result of the paper, Theorem 1, derives utility sophistication
from this axiom in the presence of arguably weak regularity assumptions on prefer-
ences, assuming both a rich set of consequences and a suﬃciently rich (speciﬁcally:
“equidivisible”) likelihood relation.
Theorem 1 also shows that under these assumptions, utility-sophisticated prefer-
ences over general acts are uniquely determined by preferences over bets and the
decision-maker’s cardinal valuation of outcomes. This powerful reduction property
parallels that of probabilistically sophisticated preferences which are uniquely deter-
mined by preferences over lotteries and the decision-maker’s subjective probability
measure. The reduction property greatly simpliﬁes the task of developing more spe-
ciﬁc models of decision-making under ambiguity, since it focusses attention on the
1Its basic idea can be described as follows. Consider two acts f and g whose outcomes diﬀer on
only two equally likely events A and B such that f yields a better outcome in event A and g yields a
better outcome in event B. Suppose also that we already have obtained a ranking of utility diﬀerences
from the decision-maker’s preferences over unambiguous acts. Tradeoﬀ Consistency requires that if
the utility gain from the outcome of f over that of g in the event A exceeds the utility gain from g
over f in the event B,t h e nf is preferred to g. More precisely, Tradeoﬀ Consistency requires that
preferences over acts can be rationalized consistently in this manner by an appropriate ranking of
utility diﬀerences .
3relatively simple class of betting preferences.2
By not assuming Savage’s axiom P4, our main representation theorem allows for
betting preferences over events to depend on the “stakes” of the bets involved. This
generality is important since in the presence of ambiguity, P4 cannot be taken to
be a requirement of rationality; indeed, there is a live interest in stake-dependent
preference models (see e.g. Epstein-Le Breton (1993), Klibanoﬀ et al. (2005)). When
betting preferences are stake-dependent, they reﬂect both event attitudes (beliefs and
ambiguity attitudes) as well as, more indirectly, consequence attitudes (utilities). The
Stake Independence axiom P4 is thus necessary to achieve a separation of consequence
and event attitudes as determinants of overall preferences. In Theorem 2 we show
that it is also suﬃcient, and characterize the restrictions that betting preferences
must satisfy to be consistent with utility sophistication.
In this analysis, utility sophistication has been deﬁned relative to a hypothetically
or situationally given likelihood relation. Is it possible to eliminate reference to be-
liefs as an independent, non-behavioral construct, and deﬁne utility sophistication in
purely behavioral terms? While we suggest that this cannot be done without arbitrari-
ness for preferences that are merely utility-sophisticated relative to sparse likelihood
relations, we propose a deﬁnition of “revealed utility sophistication” which implies
that the set of probabilistic beliefs relative to which the given preference ordering is
construed as utility-sophisticated (in the above relative sense) must be “rich” and
show that the proposed deﬁnition has attractive properties.
As an important side-beneﬁt, reﬁning and modifying earlier and related work (Ghi-
rardato et al. (2004), Nehring (1996, 2001)), this allows one to deﬁne “revealed prob-
2One particularly important type of further specialization is based on the modelling of ambiguity
attitudes (ambiguity aversion versus ambiguity seeking). In a companion paper, we argue that these
can indeed be modelled naturally in terms of assumptions relating betting preferences and partial
proabilistic beliefs (cf. Nehring 2001).
4abilistic beliefs” in a natural manner. We argue that the restriction of this deﬁnition
to revealed utility-sophisticated preferences makes it immune to the interpretative
ambiguities that characterized these earlier contributions.
Comparison to the existing literature.–
While the existing literature has not yet attempted to deﬁne a distinct notion of util-
ity sophistication, we show in section 5.2 that, after translation into the present frame-
work, many models of decision making under ambiguity in the Anscombe-Aumann
framework give rise to revealed utility-sophisticated preferences, starting from the
seminal contributions of Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa-Schmeidler (1989).
Other contributions, especially Ghirardato-Marinacci (2002) and Ghirardato et al.
(2004), assume a utility-sophisticated viewpoint by assuming in the interpretation
of their deﬁnitions and axioms that all departures from expected utility can be at-
tributed to ambiguity. However, as argued by Epstein-Zhang (2001) and discussed
further in sections 6 and 7, such an interpretational assumption may be arbitrary or
inappropriate.
Organization of the paper.–
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce
likelihood relations and their multi-prior representation, as well as basic assumptions
on preferences maintained throughout. We then deﬁne the notion of utility sophis-
tication and characterize it axiomatically (section 3), paying particular attention to
the case of “stake-independent” (P4) betting preferences (section 4). In section 5, we
study utility sophistication in various preference models in the literature, and estab-
lish a close link to standard models in the Anscombe-Aumann (1963) framework; inter
alia, we show that CEU preferences are never utility-sophisticated with respect to a
rich likelihood relation unless they are SEU. Section 6 quantiﬁes out the likelihood
5relation to arrive at a deﬁnition of “revealed utility-sophisticated beliefs” and shows
it to satisfy important desiderata. The deﬁnition naturally suggests an accompanying
deﬁnition of “revealed probabilistic beliefs” as discussed in section 7. All proofs are
c o n t a i n e di nt h ea p p e n d i x .
2. BACKGROUND
2.1. Equidivisible Likelihood Relations
Since utility sophistication is to be deﬁned relative to a speciﬁed set of probabilistic
beliefs, we shall model a decision maker in terms of two entities, a preference relation
% over Savage acts and a comparative likelihood relation D describing some or all of
his probabilistic beliefs. Formally, a likelihood relation is a partial ordering D on an
algebra of events Σ in a state space Ω, with the instance A D B denoting the DM’s
judgment that A is at least as likely as B. We shall denote the symmetric component
of D (“is as likely as”) by ≡. For now, we shall treat the likelihood relation as an
independent primitive. To emphasize its typically non-exhaustive interpretation, the
likelihood relation is frequently referred to as the decision-maker’s (belief) “context”;
an important example is the existence an independent randomization device as de-
scribed in Example 1 below. The viability of the non-exhaustive interpretation of
D w i l lb ef o r m a l l ys u p p o r t e di ns e c t i o n6 ,P r o p o s i t i o n6 ;i nt h a ts e c t i o ni ti sa l s o
shown how a fully behavioral deﬁnition of utility sophistication can be obtained by
“quantifying out” the context D . For further discussion of the general approach, see
Nehring (2006) where the framework of “decision-making in the context of probabilis-
tic beliefs” has been introduced.
A prior π is a ﬁnitely additive, non-negative set-function on Σ such that π(Ω)=1 .
6Given a likelihood relation D, let ΠD denote its set of admissible priors deﬁned by
π ∈ ΠD if and only if, for all A,B ∈ Σ,A D B implies π(A) ≥ π(B).
For any D, ΠD is a closed convex set in the product (or weak∗) topology. Conversely,
any non-empty set of priors Π induces an associated likelihood relation DΠ given by
the unanimity condition
A DΠ B if and only if π(A) ≥ π (B)f o ra l lπ ∈ Π.
A likelihood relation D is coherent if there exists Π 6= ∅ such that D=DΠ;i nt h a t
case, D is said to be derived from Π. Clearly, if D is derived from Π, it is also derived
from the closed convex hull of Π; it is therefore without loss of generality to assume
sets of priors to be closed and convex. Furthermore, it is easily veriﬁed that D is
coherent if and and only if it is derived from the set ΠD;t h es e tΠD will therefore be
referred to as the multi-prior representation of D .3
A central role in the following will be played by likelihood relations with a convex-
ranged multi-prior representation. The set of priors Π is convex-ranged if, for any
event A ∈ Σ and any α ∈ (0,1), there exists an event B ∈ Σ,B⊆ A such that
π(B)=απ(A)f o ra l lπ ∈ Π. It is easily veriﬁed that a coherent likelihood relation D
deﬁned on a σ−algebra is derived from a convex-ranged set of priors if and only if it is
equidivisible, i.e. if and only if, for all events A ∈ Σ, there exists an event B ∈ Σ such
that B ⊆ A and B ≡ A\B. Nehring (2006) contains an axiomatization of coherent
equidivisible likelihood relations, and shows that they are derived from a unique closed
convex set of priors, namely ΠD; the latter result implies that, for any convex-ranged
Π, Π = Π(DΠ). Slightly abusing terminology, we will refer to likelihood relations with
3Note that in general there may exist multiple closed convex sets Π from which a given coherent
likelihood relation is derived; in such cases (which are precluded by the convex-rangedness assump-
tion to follow) there is a loss of information in representing beliefs by likelihood relations rather than
by sets of priors.
7convex-ranged multi-prior representation ΠD as equidivisible, whether or not they are
deﬁn e do naσ-algebra.4 Evidently, the superrelation of any equidivisible relation is
equidivisible.
Equidivisible likelihood relations are characterized by a rich set of unambiguous
and conditionally unambiguous events. Say that B ∈ Σ is unambiguous given A if,
for some α ∈ [0,1],π (B)=απ(A)f o ra l lπ ∈ ΠD. Let ΛA denote the family of events
that are unambiguous given A; clearly, ΛA is closed under ﬁnite disjoint union and
under complementation, but not necessarily under intersection. An event A is null
if A ≡ ∅, or, equivalently, if π(A) = 0 for all π ∈ ΠD. For any non-null A and any
π ∈ ΠD, let π(./A) denote the restriction of π(./A)t oΛA,w i t hπ(B/A)d e n o t i n gt h e
unambiguous conditional probability of B given A.W ew i l ls a yt h a tB is unambiguous
if it is “unambiguous given Ω”, and write Λ for ΛΩ, as well as π for π(./Ω). As a
matter of further notion, let π−(A)=m i n π∈Π π(A)a n dπ+(A)=m a x π∈Π π(A)t h e
lower and upper probabilities of event A. Also, the indicator function associated with
event A will be denoted by 1A.
Example 1 (Continuous Randomization Device). The following translates
the widely used Anscombe-Aumann (1963) framework as a likelihood relation. Con-
sider a product space Ω = Ω1×Ω2, where Ω1 is a space of “generic states” , and Ω2 a
space of “random states” with associated algebra Σ1 and σ−algebra Σ2, respectively.
Let η denote a convex-ranged5, ﬁnitely additive prior over random events Σ2 .T h e
“continuity” and stochastic independence of the random device are captured by the
following coherent likelihood relation DAA deﬁn e do nt h ep r od u c ta l g e b r aΣ = Σ1×Σ2;
note that any A ∈ Σ1 ×Σ2 can be written as A =
P
i Si × Ti, where the {Si} form a
4On an algebra, convex-rangedness is characterized by a bit more than equidivisibility proper;
convex-rangedness on algebras arises naturally in the Anscombe-Aumann context DAA deﬁned in
Example 1 below.
5That is, {η} is convex-ranged in Σ2.
8ﬁnite partition of Ω1 :6
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i if and only if η(Ti) ≥ η(T
0
i)f o ra l li.
Clearly, there exists a unique set of priors ΠAA representing DAA; indeed, ΠAA
is simply the set of all product-measures π1 × η where π1 ranges over all ﬁnitely
additive measures on Σ1. Note that the convex-rangedness of ΠAA is a straightforward
consequence of the convex-rangedness of η.
In general, a decision-maker will have further probabilistic beliefs captured by a
likelihood relation D that strictly contains the context DAA; this relation evidently
inherits the equidivisibility of DAA .
Example 2 (Limited Imprecision). A particular way to formalize the intuitive
notion of a limited extent of overall ambiguity is to assume that Σ is a σ-algebra and
that Π is the convex hull of a ﬁnite set Π0 of non-atomic, countably additive priors.
Due to Lyapunov’s (1940) celebrated convexity theorem, Π is convex-ranged. The
priors π ∈ Π0 can be interpreted as a ﬁnite set of hypotheses a decision-maker deems
reasonable without being willing to assign precise probabilities to them. Finitely
generated sets of priors occur naturally, for example, when an individual bases his
beliefs on the views of a ﬁnite set of experts who have precise probabilistic beliefs
Di but disagree with each other. The decision maker may naturally want to respect
all instances of expert agreement; these are represented by the unanimity relation
DI= ∩i∈I Di which is evidently ﬁnitely generated.
In the following, when it is necessary to refer to asymmetric likelihood compar-
isons, rather than using simply the asymmetric component B of D, it is often more
appropriate to use the “uniformly more likely” relation BB, where A BB B if
6The relation DAA is easily characterized axiomatically; see Nehring (2006).
9minπ∈ΠD (π(A) − π(B)) > 0. In general, BB is a proper subrelation of B.F o rf u r -
ther discussion and a characterization of BB in terms of D for equidivisible contexts,
see Nehring (2006).
2.2 Maintained Assumptions on Preferences
Consider now a DM described by a preference ordering over acts % and a coherent
likelihood relation D; we will typically write Π for ΠD.L e tX be a set of consequences.
An act is a ﬁnite-valued mapping from states to consequences, f : Ω → X, that is
measurable with respect to the algebra of events Σ; the set of all acts is denoted by
F.Apreference ordering % is a weak order (complete and transitive relation) on F.
An act is unambiguous if it is measurable with respect to the system of unambiguous
events Λ; the set of all unambiguous acts is denoted by Fua. The restriction of % to
Fua represents the decision maker’s risk preferences.
We shall write [x1 on A1;x2 on A2;...] for the act with consequence xi in event
Ai;c o n s t a n ta c t s[ x on Ω] are typically referred to by their constant consequence
x. To prepare the ground for the subsequent analysis, we now introduce the basic
substantive and regularity assumptions that will be maintained throughout.
The belief context constrains most directly preferences over bets. A bet is a pair of
acts with the same two outcomes, i.e. a pair of the form ([x on A;y on Ac],[x on B;y on Bc]).
Fundamental is the following rationality requirement on the relation between prefer-
ences and probabilistic beliefs.
Axiom 1 (Compatibility) For all A,B ∈ Σ and x,y ∈ X :
i) [x on A;y on A
c] % [x on B;y on B
c] if A D B and x % y, and
ii) [x on A;y on A
c] Â [x on B;y on B
c] if A BB B and x Â y.
Throughout, preferences will be assumed to be eventwise monotone in the following
weak version of Savage’s axiom P3.
10Axiom 2 (Eventwise Monotonicity) For all acts f ∈ F, consequences x,y ∈ X
and events A ∈ Σ :[ x on A;f(ω) elsewhere] % [y on A;f(ω) elsewhere] whenever
x % y.
The following condition ensures that the set of consequences is suﬃciently rich.
Axiom 3 (Solvability) For any x,y ∈ X and T ∈ Λ, there exists z ∈ X such that
z ∼ [x,T;y,Tc].
For expositional simplicity, especially in the stake-dependent case, we shall assume
throughout that consequences are bounded in utility.
Axiom 4 (Boundedness) There exist x−,x+ ∈ X such that, for all x ∈ X, x− -
x - x+.
To obtain a real-valued representation, some Archimedean property is usually as-
sumed. The following is suﬃciently strong to help deliver the main result, Theorem
1, below. Note that it is deﬁned relative to the belief context and presumes its
equidivisibility. Substantively, as conﬁrmed by the upcoming representation result,
Proposition 1, it asserts that if acts are changed on events of suﬃciently small upper
probability, strict preference does not change.
Axiom 5 (Archimedean) For any x,y ∈ X such that x % y and any acts f =[ x
on A, y on B; f otherwise] and g such that f Â g (resp. f ≺ g) and such that A is
unambiguous given A + B, there exists an event C that is unambiguous given A + B
such that C CC A and f0 =[ x on C, y on (A + B)\C; f otherwise] Â g (resp.
f0 ≺ g).
Since axioms 3 through 5 will usually show up together in the following results, it
is convenient to refer to a preference ordering satisfying these three axioms as regular.
11Let Z denote the set of ﬁnite-valued, Σ-measurable functions Z : Ω → [0,1]. Using
the above axioms, we will now establish a basic representation theorem that ensures
the existence of a utility function u mapping X onto the unit interval together with an
evaluation functional I: Z → [0,1] such that f % g if and only if I(u◦f) ≥ I(u◦g),
for all f,g ∈ F.
I is normalized if I(c1Ω)= c for all c ∈ [0,1] and I(1T)=π(T) for all T ∈ Λ.
Note that for normalized I, u is calibrated in terms of probabilities, i.e. satisﬁes
u(z)=π(T) whenever z ∼ [x+,T;x−,Tc].7 I is monotone if I(Y ) ≥ I(Z) whenever
Y ≥ Z (pointwise); I is compatible with D if I(1A) ≥ I(1B)w h e n e v e rA D B and
I(1A) >I(1B) whenever A BB B; I is event-continuous if, for any x,y ∈ X , Z ∈ Z,
E ∈ Σ,A∈ ΛE with A ⊆ E and any increasing sequence {An} of events contained
in A such that π(An/E) converges to π(A/E),I (x1An + y1E\An + Z1Ec)c o n v e r g e s
to I(x1A + y1E\A + Z1Ec).
Proposition 1 Let D be a equidivisible belief context. The following two statements
are equivalent:
i) the preference ordering % is compatible with D, eventwise monotone and regular
(Archimedean, solvable, and bounded).
ii) there exist an onto utility-function u : X → [0,1] and a functional I : Z → [0,1]
that is monotone, event-continuous and compatible with D such that
f % g if and only if I(u ◦ f) ≥ I(u ◦ g), for all f,g ∈ F.
There is a unique pair (u,I) satisfying ii) such that I is normalized.
In the sequel, preferences over bets will play a special role. We shall frequently but
not always assume that preferences over bets depend only on the events involved, not
on the stakes. This is captured by Savage’s axiom P4.
7To see this, z ∼ [x+,T;x−,Tc] implies I(u(z)1Ω)= I(1T). Thus by the two normalization con-
ditions u(z)=I(u(z)1Ω)= I(1T)=π(T).
12Axiom 6 (Stake Independence, P4) For all x,y,x0,y0 ∈ X such that x Â y and
x0 Â y0 and all A,B ∈ Σ :
[x on A;y on Ac] % [x on B;y on Bc] iﬀ [x0 on A;y0 on Ac] % [x0 on B;y0 on Bc].
We will frequently use the notation A %bet B for the preference [x+ on A;x− on
Ac] % [x+ on B;x− on Bc]. This notation is primarily motivated by the stake-
independent case in which the relation %bet completely summarizes the DM’s beliefs
and ambiguity attitudes.8 If preferences are utility-sophisticated, this turns out to be
the case even when betting preferences are stake-dependent.
Compatibility of betting preferences with a given belief context ensures a ranking
of bets on unambiguous events T according to their unambiguous probability π(T).
Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, there exists a unique set-function ρ : Σ →
[0,1] representing %bet that is additive on unambiguous events and has ρ(Ω)=1 ;ρ
assigns to each event the probability π(T) of any unambiguous event to which it is
indiﬀerent. If I is normalized, clearly ρ(A)=I (1A). The properties on I introduced
above translate naturally into properties of ρ. In particular, ρ is compatible with D
if ρ(A) ≥ ρ(B)w h e n e v e rA D B and ρ(A) >ρ (B)w h e n e v e rA BB B ; ﬁnally,
ρ is event-continuous if, for any disjoint B,E ∈ Σ, any A ∈ ΛE with A ⊆ E and
any increasing (respectively decreasing) sequence {An} of events contained in (resp.
containing) A such that π(An/E) converges to π(An/E),ρ (An + B)c o n v e r g e st o
ρ(A + B).
8In the stake-independent case, %bet is formally equivalent to Savage’s “revealed likelihood”
relation; such an interpretation is not warranted in the presence of ambiguity, however, since the
relation incorporates not merely beliefs in this case (however construed) but also ambiguity attitudes.
133. UTILITY SOPHISTICATED PREFERENCES
The fundamental goal of this paper is to provide axiomatic foundations for the
intuitive notion of a decision-maker who departs from expected-utility only for reasons
of ambiguity. This idea can be formulated transparently with reference to exogenously
speciﬁed belief context D in terms of the following property of utility sophistication.
Deﬁnition 1 (Utility Sophistication) The preference relation % is utility-sophisticated
with respect to Π if there exists u : X → R such that f % g (resp. f Â g) whenever
Eπu ◦ f ≥ Eπu ◦ g (resp. Eπu ◦ f>E πu ◦ g) for all π ∈ Π; % is utility-sophisticated
with respect to the context D if it is utility-sophisticated with respect to ΠD.9
To motivate the key axiom underlying utility sophistication, consider ﬁrst the rank-
ing of unambiguous (risky) acts for which utility sophistication entails EU maximiza-
tion with respect to the probability measure π. Speciﬁcally, consider choices among
unambiguous acts f and g with two outcomes, each of which with subjective prob-
ability one half, and assume that f =[ x on A;y on Ac]a n dg =[ x0 on A;y0 on Ac]
with x Â x0 , y0 Â y and A ≡ Ac. According to a classical interpretation of expected
utility theory, a DM should choose f over g exactly if he assesses the utility gain from
x over x0 to exceed the utility loss of obtaining y rather than y0. The preference of f
over g by a DM committed to this principle reveals a greater utility gain from x over
x0 than from y0 over y.T h u s ,i ft h eD Mc h o o s e sf =[ x on A;y on Ac]o v e rg =[ x0 on
A;y0 on Ac], consistency requires that he also choose the act [x on E;y on Ec]o v e r[ x0
on E;y0 on Ec], where E is any other event that is equally likely to its complement,
9By the uniqueness of the multi-prior representation of equidivisible contexts mentioned above,
for convex-ranged Π, utility-sophistication with respect to Π is the same as utility-sophistication
with respect to DΠ. However, without equidivisibility, it may be that Π ( Π(DΠ), so that utility-
sophistication with respect to a set of priors cannot be equated to utility-sophistication with respect
to the associated likelihood relation.
14E ≡ Ec.10
The following “Trade-oﬀ Consistency” axiom generalizes this consistency require-
ment to choices of the form f =[ x on A;y on B;f(ω) elsewhere] versus g =[ x0 on
A;y0 on B;f(ω) elsewhere] whenever the events A and B are judged equally likely
(A ≡ B), whether or not they are unambiguous themselves. Since the relative prob-
abilities of the events A and B are judged to be equal, the comparison between the
acts f and g boils down to a comparison of the respective utility gains as the decisive
decision criterion also in this more general case. In order to compare the acts f and
g, the DM simply does not need to consider his (possibly imprecise) assessment of
the likelihood of the union A + B, nor the payoﬀs in states outside A + B.T h i s
motivates the following rationality axiom according to which the DM’s preferences
must be consistently rationalizable in terms of utility diﬀerences in the manner just
described.
Axiom 7 (Tradeoﬀ Consistency) For all x,y,x0,y0 ∈ X such that x % x0,
acts f,g ∈ F and events A disjoint from B and A0 disjoint from B0 such that A ≡
B BB ∅ and A0 ≡ B0 :
if [x on A;y on B;f(ω) elsewhere] % [x0 on A;y0 on B;f(ω) elsewhere],
then [x on A0;y on B0;g(ω) elsewhere] % [x0 on A0;y0 on B0;g(ω) elsewhere].
Note the restriction to events A and B of strictly positive lower probability; it
ensures that the premise “[x on A;y on B;f(ω)e l s e w h e r e ]% [x0 on A;y0 on B;f(ω)
elsewhere]” implies that the utility advantage of x over x0 is not smaller than that
of y0 over y if the latter is positive. Note also that, for equidivisible contexts D,
10This consistency requirement is in fact axiom 2 of Ramsey’s (1931) seminal contribution. Con-
ditions requiring consistency of trade-oﬀs across choices have been used elsewhere in the axiomati-
zations of SEU and CEU theory; see in particular Wakker (1989).
15Trade-oﬀ Consistency entails Eventwise Monotonicity.11
For Trade-oﬀ Consistency to allow for ambiguity, the restriction to equally likely
rather than merely indiﬀerent events A and B respectively A0 and B0 is crucial.
Indeed, if one replaced this clause by a weaker one requiring these events to be
indiﬀerent as bets (A ∼bet B and A0 ∼bet B0), the resulting stronger axiom would
force betting preferences to satisfy the additivity condition
A ∼bet B if and only if A + C ∼bet B + C, for any A,B, and C,
and thereby impose SEU.
Trade-oﬀ Consistency becomes particularly powerful if the underlying belief context
is equidivisible. For in this case not only does it entail utility sophistication, utility
sophistication itself becomes particularly powerful, as it implies that a DM’s multi-act
preferences are determined by his preferences over unambiguous acts together with
his preferences over bets. Mathematically, this is the consequence of the existence of
an o n - l i n e a re x p e c t a t i o no p e r a t o rt h a tr e ﬂects the DM’s ambiguity attitudes.
The key to deriving this built-in expectation operator is the mixture-space structure
induced by equidivisible belief contexts as introduced in Nehring (2006). With each
Z ∈ Z, one can associate an equivalence class [Z]o fe v e n t sA ∈ Σ as follows. Let
A ∈ [Z] if there exists a partition {Ei} of Ω such that Z =
P
zi1Ei, and such that,
for all i ∈ I and π ∈ Π : π(A ∩ Ei)=ziπ(Ei). Note that [Z]i sn o n - e m p t yb yt h e
convex-rangedness of Π. Moreover, it is easily seen that for any two A,B ∈ [Z]:
π(A)=π(B) for all π ∈ Π, and thus A ≡ B. Hence by Compatibility also A ∼bet B.
One therefore arrives at a well-deﬁned ordering of random variables d %bet on Z by
11Indeed, for equivisible contexts, Eventwise Monotonicity is simply Tradeoﬀ Consistency re-
stricted to cases in which x = y, x0 = y0 , A + B = Ω and A ≡ B, with A0 + B0 ranging over
all events E ∈ Σ. It is for the purpose of enabling this implication that we have not required the
condition y0 % y in the deﬁnition of Tradeoﬀ Consistency.
16setting
Y d %betZ if A %bet B, for any A ∈ [Y ]a n dB ∈ [Z].
Let b ρ denote the associated unique extension of ρ to Z given by
b ρ(Z)=ρ(A)f o ra n yA ∈ [Z]. (1)
Again, by the construction of the mixture-space, this is well-deﬁned, and one has
Y d %betZ if and only if b ρ(Y ) ≥ b ρ(Z).
Clearly, by Compatibility, b ρ is a monotone, normalized evaluation functional on Z.
We shall call b ρ(Z) the “intrinsic integral” of Z.
We are now in a position to state the main result of the paper.
Theorem 1 Let D be an equidivisible belief context. The following three statements
are equivalent:
1. The preference ordering % is regular, trade-oﬀ consistent and compatible with
D.
2. The preference ordering % is Archimedean and utility-sophisticated with respect
to D, for some onto function u : X → [0,1].
3. There exists an onto function u : X → [0,1] and an event-continuous set-
function ρ compatible with D with associated intrinsic integral b ρ deﬁned by (1) such
that, for all f,g ∈ F:
f % g iﬀ b ρ(u ◦ f) ≥ b ρ(u ◦ g).
Theorem 1 achieves two things. First of all, it delivers an axiomatic foundation
for utility-sophisticated preferences when the underlying belief context is equidivisible
and when the set of consequences is rich; both of these assumptions are used essentially
in the derivation. As a signiﬁcant surplus value, it shows that utility sophistication
17in the equidivisible case entails the existence of an intrinsic-integral representation.
This implies that multi-act preferences are completely determined by event attitudes
(captured by betting preferences and represented by ρ) and consequence attitudes
(capture by preferences over unambiguous acts and represented by u).12 By conse-
quence, all departures from SEU can be fully explained by non-additivity of betting
preferences.
4. SEPARATING EVENT ATTITUDES FROM CONSEQUENCE
ATTITUDES
As an important dimension of its generality, Theorem 1 does not assume Stake
Independence (Savage’s axiom P4). While in the context of probabilistically sophisti-
cated preferences P4 is typically viewed as a rationality axiom expressing consistency
of revealed likelihood judgements, this interpretation is no longer viable under am-
biguity, since in this more general context betting preferences may reﬂect not just
likelihood judgments but also ambiguity attitudes.
We submit that, having lost its original rationale, under ambiguity P4 can no longer
be viewed as a rationality condition as there does not seem to be anything genuinely
“inconsistent” or even strange in stake dependence. For example, in the context
of an Ellsberg urn experiment, a decision maker may well prefer a bet of $1 on a
draw from an urn with unknown composition (getting $0 otherwise) over a bet of $1
on an event with an objective probability of 40%, and exhibit at the same time the
opposite preference once the stakes are raised to $10,000 (versus $0). Such preferences
can naturally interpreted as reﬂecting greater ambiguity aversion at greater possible
12Since b ρ is constructed from ρ with reference to the context D, it may appear that the context
also plays a role in determining %. We shall show however below that this is not the case, at least
in the standard case of preferences satisfying P4; this follows immediately from the ﬁnal assertion
in Proposition 2 below.
18gains. The bottom line is that P4 should be viewed as a well-behavedness rather than
rationality condition.13
In the absence of P4, betting preferences over extreme stakes represented by %bet
fail to describe preferences over bets with intermediate stakes. However, if preferences
are utility-sophisticated, %bet determines the intrinsic integral b ρ, and thus all prefer-
ences (in particular: all betting preferences) are determined once consequence / risk
attitudes captured by u are given. As a result, preferences over bets with intermediate
stakes will partly depend on these attitudes. By modus tollens, Stake Independence
P4 is therefore necessary for a clean separation of consequence and pure event at-
titudes (beliefs and ambiguity attitudes). In this section, we will show that Stake
Independence is also suﬃcient for such a separation and characterize the restrictions
on stake-independent betting preferences imposed by utility sophistication.
First, P4 turns out to be equivalent to the following invariance properties of betting
preferences.
Axiom 8 (Union Invariance) For any T ∈ Λ and any A,B ∈ Σ disjoint
from T : A %bet B if and only if A + T %bet B + T.
Axiom 9 (Splitting Invariance) For any A,B ∈ Σ and any partitions of A
and B into equally likely subevents {A1,...,An} and {B1,...,Bn},with Ai ≡ Aj and
Bi ≡ Bj for all i,j ≤ n, A %bet B if and only if A1 %bet B1.
The two invariance axioms are intuitive and have intrinsic appeal even in the ab-
sence of utility sophistication. In view of their appeal, it is not surprising that both
conditions have some incognito precedents in the literature. On the one hand, Epstein-
Zhang (2001) eﬀectively build Union Invariance into their very deﬁnition of an event
13Such a view also resolves the conﬂict between dynamic consistency and P4 outside SEU observed
by Epstein-Le Breton (1993). Moreover, note that restricted to bets on unambiguous events, P4 still
obtains as an implication of compatibility with the underlying belief context, and does not need to
be assumed independently.
19T as “revealed unambiguous”.14 Splitting Invariance as well is not entirely new, as it
can be reformulated as a restriction on betting preferences over independent events.
Say that events A and B are independent if π(B/A)=π(B/Ac)f o ra l lπ ∈ Π.I f
preferences are compatible with the equidivisible context D as maintained, then it
can be shown easily that they satisfy Splitting Invariance if and only if
ρ(A × B)=ρ(A)ρ(B)( 2 )
for all A ∈ Σ and B ∈ Λ such that A and B are independent. In deﬁning “product
capacities” for independent events, authors such as Ghirardato (1997) and Hendon
et al. (1996) have appealed to generalizations of (2) that allow both events A and B
to be ambiguous.
Alternatively, P4 can be characterized in terms of “constant-linearity” of the eval-
uation functional I. An evaluation functional I (in particular b ρ)i sconstant-additive
if I(Y + c1Ω)=I(Y )+c; I is positively homogeneous if I(αY )=αI(Y ) for any
α ∈ [0,1]; I is constant-linear if it is constant-additive and positively homogeneous.
Again, this condition is of independent interest and has been studied in the litera-
ture, especially by Ghirardato et al. (2004) . Note that, for two-outcome acts [x on
A;y on Ac]w i t hx % y, a constant-linear intrinsic integral has the following simple
“biseparable” representation (Ghirardato-Marinacci (2001))
b ρ(u ◦ f)=u(x)ρ(A)+u(y)(1− ρ(A)).
Constant Linearity can be viewed as a cardinal stake-invariance property of multi-act
preferences. The following result derives this property from the weaker and arguably
more primitive ordinal P4 property, assuming utility sophistication.
14That is to say, Epstein-Zhang’s deﬁnition of revealed unambiguous events is such that Union
Invariance (applied to revealed unambiguous events instead of Λ)h o l d sb yd e ﬁnition.
20Theorem 2 Suppose % is regular, trade-oﬀ consistent and compatible with the equidi-
visible context D. Then the following three statements are equivalent.
1. % satisﬁes P4.
2. I is constant-linear.
3. % satisﬁes Union and Splitting Invariance.
In the Appendix, we demonstrate the implications 2) =⇒ 1), 1) =⇒ 3), and 3) =⇒
2). The ﬁr s ti m p l i c a t i o n2 )= ⇒ 1) is valid for any constant-linear evaluation functional
I, without reference to an equidivisible belief context. The second implication 1) =⇒
3) relates two diﬀerent properties of betting preferences, making essential use of utility
sophistication. Finally, the implication 3) =⇒ 2) mirrors the invariance properties
of betting preferences in corresponding properties of the intrinsic integral b ρ; utility
sophistication closes the circle via the identity I = b ρ.15
Theorem 2 entails the desired separation of event attitudes from consequence valu-
ations, as formalized by the following result. Note that while Theorem 2 shows that
utility sophistication imposes Union- and Splitting Invariance on stake-independent
betting preferences, the following Proposition 2 adds that these are in fact the only
restrictions on betting preferences imposed by utility sophistication. In this result,
%ua represent given (EU maximizing) risk-preferences while %B represents given bet-
ting preferences; the two must agree on the set of bets on unambiguous events. The
result asserts that these are jointly consistent with utility sophistication if and only
if %B satisﬁes Union- and Splitting-Invariance, and that in this case they determine
15It may seem a bit surprising that utility sophistication entails non-trivial restrictions on betting
preferences given stake-independence. To see how this is possible, note that while utility sophistica-
tion by iteslf does not restrict betting preferences for given stakes x and y, it does constrain betting
preferences across stakes, even in the absence of P4. The existence of such restrictions explains
how the imposition of further restrictions on betting preferences across stakes such as P4 can entail
restrictions on betting preferences for given stakes.
21the overall preference ordering uniquely.
Proposition 2 Let D be an equidivisible context. Let %ua be a preference ordering
on unambiguous acts Fua that is trade-oﬀ consistent, regular, and compatible with D
restricted to Λ. Furthermore, let %B be a complete and transitive relation on Σ that
is Archimedean and compatible with D such that (%ua)bet agrees with the restriction
of %B to Λ × Λ. Then the following two statements are equivalent:
1. %B satisﬁes Union and Splitting Invariance with respect to D.
2. There exists a preference ordering % on all of F that is stake-independent,
Archimedean and tradeoﬀ-consistent with respect to D and whose restrictions to Fua
and %bet agree with %ua and %B, respectively.
The preference ordering speciﬁed in (2) is unique. Furthermore, this ordering does
not depend on the context D.16
5. UTILITY SOPHISTICATION IN PARTICULAR MODELS
5.1 Models with EU aggregators
Note that Utility Sophistication can be reformulated essentially equivalently using
the notion of an aggregator Ψ of the expected-utility values under the admissible
priors in Π. To this purpose, let EΠ : Z → [0,1]Π denote the evaluation operator
given by EΠ (Z)=( EπZ)π∈Π for Z ∈ Z;f o ra n ya c tf, EΠu◦f is the vector of
expected utilities (Eπu ◦ f)π∈Π induced by f.17 Clearly, EΠ (Z) is a convex subset of
[0,1]Π. An EU aggregator is simply a monotone mapping Ψ : EΠ (Z) → [0,1]. Then,
up to minor technicalities, Utility Sophistication with respect to Π is equivalent to
16The latter statement is made formally precise in the proof of Proposition 2.
17Note also that in view of the Krein-Milman theorem one could restrict attention to the subvector
(Eπu ◦ f)π∈Ext(Π) .
22the existence of an EU aggregator Ψ, an operator EΠ and a utility-function u such
that
f % g if and only if Ψ(EΠ (u ◦ f)) ≥ Ψ(EΠ (u ◦ g)), for any f,g ∈ F.
A variety of models in the literature can be put in this form. For example, the Mini-
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for some monotone function Υ; see e.g. Jaﬀray (1989). Such “Interval EU” preferences
satisfy P4 if and only if Υ is linear, i.e. if and only only if Ψ can be written as
Ψ(U)=αmax
π∈Π
Uπ +( 1− α)min
π∈Π
Uπ,
which is Hurwicz’s classical optimism-pessimism criterion.18 Dubbed α-MEU, it has
been axiomatized by Ghirardato et al. (2004) and Kopylov (2002).
Klibanoﬀ et al. (2005) study preferences associated with aggregators
Ψ(U)=Eµφ(Uπ),
where µ is a probability-measure on Π, and φ : R → R is strictly increasing and
continuous (typically smooth). If φ is smooth, then bets [x on A;y on Ac] with small
stakes (i.e. with u(x)−u(y) close to zero), are evaluated approximately according to
Eµπ. Thus, such preferences will satisfy P4 if and only if φ is linear, i.e. SEU.
18This follows from Theorem 2 together with Ghirardato et al.’s (2004) demonstration of the
equivalence of the constant-linearity of I and the constant-α representation.
23Another fairly diverse class of preferences with an EU aggregator representation
has been studied in Siniscalchi’s (2003) “plausible priors” model; all of these satisfy
P4 by construction.
Finally, somewhat outside the present framework by considering choice-functions
rather than weak orders, in Nehring’s (1991,2000) “Simultaneous Expected Utility”
model Ψ(U) is the lexicographic minimum of appropriately renormalized expected
utilities; the renormalization allows an interpretation of the solution as a bargaining
solution among alternative selves associated with the extremal priors ext(Π). All
of the above contributions are situated in variants of the Anscombe-Aumann (1963)
framework. This is no accident: indeed, by translating these contributions into the
present setting, we will see that the typical assumptions made there imply utility
sophistication with respect to the AA context DAA.
5.2 Utility Sophistication in the Anscombe-Aumann Framework
The Anscombe-Aumann (1963) framework is distinguished by taking acts to be
mappings from states to probability distributions of consequences, rather than simply
as mappings from states to consequences as in the Savage (1954) framework. These
probability distributions are interpreted as objective probabilities of the realizations
of an external random device (“roulette lotteries”) that is not part of the explicitly
modeled state space. In section 2, we have restated this description as an equidivisible
context DAA. We will begin by showing how a preference relation over Savage acts
can be redescribed as a preference relation over Anscombe-Aumann (AA-) acts and
vice versa.
Formally, an AA-act F is a ﬁnite-valued Σ1-measurable mapping from the subjec-
tive state space Ω1 to the set of probability distributions on X with ﬁnite support L.
Let FAA denote their set. Denoting elements of L by q =( qx)x∈X ,w i t hqx as the
probability of obtaining x under q, one can write F =[ q1 on S1;q2 on S2;...]i na n a l o g y
24to the notation for Savage acts. Note that since Σ is the product algebra of Σ1 and Σ2,
any Savage act f can be written in the form [xi,j on Si × Ti,j]i≤n,j≤ni for appropriate
n and {ni}i≤n. One can thus associate with any Savage act f =[ xij on Si × Tij]t h e
AA-act F (f)=[ pi on Si], with px
i =
P
j≤ni,xij=x η(Ti,j); the AA-act F (f) associates
with any subjective state ω ∈ Ω1 the lottery that yields the consequence x with un-
ambiguous (subjective) probability entailed by the likelihood judgments DAA . By the
equidivisibility of DAA, this mapping is onto, i.e. any AA-act is the image of some
Savage act.
In order to associate with the given preference relation % over Savage acts a well-
deﬁned preference relation over AA acts, one needs to extend the assumption that
preferences are compatible with respect to the context DAA in the following natural
way.19
Axiom 10 (Strong Compatibility) For all f ∈ F, x,y ∈ X and A,B ⊆ C ∈ Σ :
i) [x on A;y on C\A; f elsewhere] % [x on B;y on C\B; f elsewhere] if A D B and x % y, and
ii) [x on A;y on C\A; f elsewhere] Â [x on B;y on C\B; f elsewhere] if A BB B and x Â y.
Note that Compatibility is simply Strong Compatibility restricted to the case of
C = Ω; in turn, Strong Compatibility is entailed by Utility Sophistication.20




x:x%AAy qx; p stochastically dominates q strictly if at least one of these inequalities
is strict. The AA-act F =[ pi on Si] (strictly) stochastically dominates the AA-act
F =[ qi on Si]i fpi (strictly) stochastically dominates qi for every i.
19Strong Compatibility is called “Likelihood Consequentialism” in Nehring (2006) where it has
been introduced and discussed in greater detail.
20The second, strict part of Strong Compatibility plays no role in the following; we have included
it only to ensure that Stong Compatibility entails Compatibility.
25Fact 1 The following two conditions are equivalent for a weak order % on F:
i) % is strongly compatible with DAA
ii) For all f,g such that F(f) stochastically dominates F(g) (resp. strictly stochas-
tically dominates) f % g (resp. f Â g).
It is immediate from part ii) that if % is strongly compatible with DAA, any f,f0
such that F(f)=F(f
0) must be indiﬀerent. One thus obtains a well-deﬁned weak
order on FAA by setting
F %AA G :⇔ f % g for any f and g such that F = F(f)a n dG = F(g).
Furthermore, %AA respects stochastic dominance. The following result is therefore
a straightforward corollary of Fact 1; it implies that preferences over Savage acts that
are strongly compatible with the context DAA and preferences over AA-acts that
respect AA Stochastic Dominance are essentially the same object.
Proposition 3 If the preference ordering over Savage acts are strongly compatible
with the context DAA, the associated preference ordering %AA respects AA stochastic
dominance. Conversely, if the preference ordering % over AA-acts respects stochastic
dominance, there exists a unique preference ordering % that is strongly compatible
with DAA such that % = %AA .
We will now show that the standard assumptions on AA preferences in contri-
butions such as Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa-Schmeidler (1989) amount to utility
sophistication of the corresponding preferences over Savage acts. These assumptions
are summarized by the following three axioms.
Axiom 11 (Monotonicity) For all acts F ∈ FAA, lotteries p,q ∈ L and events
S ∈ Σ1 :[ p on S;F(ω) elsewhere] %AA [q on S;F(ω) elsewhere] whenever p % q.
26Axiom 12 (Lottery Independence) For all lotteries p,q,r ∈ L and all α ∈ (0,1] :
p %AA q if and only if αp +( 1− α)r %AA αq +( 1− α)r.
Axiom 13 (Certainty Independence) For all acts F,G ∈ FAA, constant acts
(lotteries) H ∈ FAA
const = L and all α ∈ (0,1] : F %AA G i fa n do n l yi fαF +
(1 − α)H %AA αG +( 1− α)H.21
The two main results of the paper, Theorem 1 and 2 yield the following result.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the preference ordering % is regular and strongly com-
patible with the context DAA.L e t%AA denote the associate preference ordering over
AA-acts. Then
i) % satisﬁes Trade-oﬀ Consistency if and only if %AA satisﬁes Monotonicity and
Lottery Independence. Furthermore,
ii) % satisﬁes Trade-oﬀ Consistency and Stake Independence (P4) if and only if
%AA satisﬁes Monotonicity and Certainty Independence.
Proposition 4 yields a subjective, epistemic foundation of the standard modelling
of ambiguity in the AA framework. All axioms are conditions on preferences over
Savage acts, some of them formulated in relation to a given belief context. Since all
uncertainty is treated on par as part of a single state space, all purely behavioral
assumptions carry their usual, transparent meaning. By contrast, the original AA
framework treats objective and subjective uncertainty diﬀerently; while the trick of
including the objective uncertainty in the consequences is mathematically neat, it
rather drastically changes the meaning of standard assumptions such as Monotonicity
which turns out to be much stronger than usual.22 On the other hand, Certainty
21As usual, this mixture-operation is deﬁned pointwise.
22This intransparency potentially aﬀects assumptions made within this framework to characterize
speciﬁc preference models. Epstein (1999), for example, criticizes Schmeidler’s (1989) and Gilboa-
27Independence, which looks rather ad hoc and has no direct counterpart in the Savage
framework, can be replaced by the transparent and standard assumption of stake
independence.
The above epistemic subjective rendering of the AA setup is diﬀerent from the
recent preference-based translation by Ghirardato et al. (2003). The key to their
work is a preference-based deﬁnition of utility-mixtures. It allows them to appeal in
a Savage setting to axioms and results that are mathematically analogous to those
formulated originally in an AA setting. However, since these axioms and results now
refer to diﬀerent objects, namely Savage rather than Anscombe-Aumann acts, they
have rather diﬀerent content.
5.3 Choquet Expected Utility
A main contribution of Theorem 1 was to show that utility sophistication with
respect to an equidivisible context implies the determination of preferences over gen-
eral multi-valued acts from preferences over unambiguous (risky) acts and preferences
over bets expressed by the intrinsic integral b ρ. The Choquet Expected Utility (CEU)
model which ranks acts according to the Choquet integral of utilities
R
u◦fdν is the
main alternative model in the literature with this property.23 In contrast to utility
Schmeidler’s (1989) deﬁnition of ambiguity aversion as too restrictive and/or inapplicable in a Savage
setting. In Nehring (2001), we have formulated a deﬁnition of ambiguity aversion in terms of betting
preferences, and show that it yields Schmeidler’s in the utility-sophisticated case. In the absence of
utility-sophistication, for example in the context of the CEU model, the new deﬁnition has however
none of the restrictive and undesirable implications critized by Epstein.
Likewise, one obtains Schmeidler’s (1989) “mixed CEU” model by imposing “Comonotonic Inde-
pendence” restricted to non-random (Σ1-measurable) acts; this simple observation throws light on
the well-known fact that Schmeidler’s model is quite distinct from proper CEU models as formulated
in a Savage framework (Gilboa 1987, Sarin-Wakker 1992).
23This property comes out especially clearly in Sarin-Wakker’s (1992) axiomatization based on
a Cumulative Dominance axiom which explicitly constructs multi-act preferences from preferences
28sophistication, the CEU model is designed to also allow for departures from expected
utility in the absence of ambiguity, accommodating for example the Allais (1953)
paradox. If one writes the non-normalized capacity ν as φ ◦ ρ, such departures are
reﬂected in the non-linearity of φ.
When are Choquet preferences utility-sophisticated? While this can happen when
the underlying context is not equidivisible, it never happens under equidivisibility in
the presence of any ambiguity.
Proposition 5 Suppose that a CEU preference ordering % is utility-sophisticated
relative to the equidivisible context D;t h e n% is in fact SEU.
To illustrate the incompatibility of CEU preferences with utility sophistication,
consider a decision-maker with CEU preferences ordering who is an EU maximizer
over unambiguous acts (i.e. with φ = id). Let A be an “ambiguous” event with
respect to which the decision-maker is ambiguity averse a la Ellsberg, i.e. for which
ρ(A)+ρ(Ac) < 1. Denote consequences in (non-normalized) utiles, and take B ⊆ Ac
such that B ≡ Ac\B.L e tT be any unambiguous event such that T ≡ Tc. At issue
is the comparison of the constant act 1Ω,a n dt h ea c tf given as
[1 on A,2o nB,0o nA
c\B].
Conditional on Ac, this act entails an unambiguous 50-50 lottery with utility-payoﬀs
2o r0 .S i n c e1 Ω ∼ [2 on T,0o nTc]b ya s s u m p t i o n ,T r a d e - o ﬀ Consistency implies
f ∼ 1Ω.
Since the act f has therefore expected utility of 1 for every prior π ∈ Π,o nt h e
Bernoulli Principle, the act f has a certainty equivalent of 1 irrespective of the
over bets.
29DM’s ambiguity attitudes, even though the probabilities of its outcomes are am-
biguous. By contrast, a CEU maximizer evaluates the act f as if its valuation (cer-
tainty equivalent) was ambiguous. Indeed, one easily computes that
R
u ◦ fdν =
2ρ(B)+1[ρ(A + B) − ρ(B)] = ρ(A + B)+ρ(B). If one assumes for simplicity that
betting preferences are based on lower probabilities (i.e. ρ(E)=m i n π∈Ξ π(E) for all
E, for some Ξ ⊆ Π), this implies24 that in fact
Z
















f ≺ 1Ω. (4)
Thus the ambiguity of the individual outcomes leads the ambiguity-averse CEU
decision maker to discount the act f relative to its unambiguous expected util-
ity. Moreover, this discount is proportional to the ambiguity of A measured by
maxπ∈Ξ π(A) − minπ∈Ξ π(A), and can be large (up to 1
2).
Proposition 5 reveals a fundamental incompatibility between rank-dependence and
the Bernoulli principle.25 This incompatibility extends to non-P4 generalizations of
CEU such as Cumulative Prospect Theory, and does not hinge on equidivisibility of
the context. If the context is not equidivisible, there often exist some non-degenerate
utility-sophisticated CEU preferences, but their set will in many cases still be fairly
degenerate.26
24Indeed, one easily computes that ρ(A + B)=1
2 (1 + minπ∈Ξ π(A)) and ρ(B)=
1
2 minπ∈Ξ π (Ac).
25At ﬁrst glance, Proposition 5 might seem to conﬂict with a well-known result of Schmeidler
(1989) who showed that the CEU and MEU models coincide for convex capacities. Proposition 5
thus implies that capacities that are compatible with an equidivisible context cannot be convex,
which can also be easily veriﬁed directly.
26For example, let µ1 and µ2 denote probability measures on two distinct subalgebras A1,A2 ⊆ Σ,
and let A denote the smallest algebra containing both A1 and A2. Let Π denote the set of priors π
305.4. A Two-Way Classiﬁcation of Preference Models
The above discussion allows one to classify a variety of preference models proposed
in the literature according to their utility sophistication and stake-independence. To
tie in directly with the literature, we assume that all models are situated in the epis-
temized version of the traditional AA model analyzed in section 5.2 using Proposition
4. In particular, utility sophistication is taken to properly mean “utility sophistication
relative to the context DAA”.
Note that on this understanding, the MEU model due to Gilboa-Schmeidler (1989)
does not coincide with the class of multi-prior preferences over Savage acts (as axiom-
atized by Casadesus et al. (2000) and Ghirar d a t oe ta l .( 2 0 0 3 ) )t h a ta r es t r o n g l yc o m -
patible with DAA.27 As noted in section 5.3, CEU preferences (and rank-dependent
more generally) can be compatible with the DAA as an equidivisible context only
when they are degenerate (SEU). We have discussed various stake-dependent (non-
P4) preference models and their utility sophistication above. In particular, we noted
that utility-smooth preferences will in general violate P4. By contrast, event-smooth
preferences (i.e. preferences that are locally linear in events) as in the work of
Machina (2004) and Epstein (1999) do not conﬂict with P4 per se; for example, event-
smoothness imposes only mild conditions on CEU preferences. However, in view of
the identity of utility-evaluation functional I and the implicit integral b ρ under util-
ity sophistication, event-smoothness and utility-smoothness are essentially the same
thing for utility-sophisticated preferences; this implies the absence event-smooth pref-
that agree with µi on Ai. It follows from the analysis in Nehring (1999) that if a CEU preference
relation is utility-sophisticated with respect to Π, the representing capacity must be additive on all
of A. Of course, utility-sophistication by itself carries no such implication, as evidenced by the MEU
model; nor does the assumption of CEU preferences: in general, many CEU preferences are strongly
compatible with DΠ, without eliminating ambiguity about events in A\(A1 ∪ A2).
27Example 3 below illustrates the diﬀerence.
31erences that are utility-sophisticated as well as stake-independent but do not coincide
with SEU.28 Finally, while stake-independence is generally lost under conditioning,
utility sophistication is preserved.
— Utility Sophistication
Non-P4
Cumulative Prospect Theory (KT 92)
Utility-Smooth Preferences
Event-Smooth Preferences (Machina 04)
Conditional Pref. (Epstein-Le Breton 93)
Interval Expected Utility (Jaﬀray 89)
Utility-Smooth Preferences (KMM 05)
Event-Smooth Preferences (Machina 04)
Conditional Util. Soph. Preferences
P4
CEU (Gilboa 89, Sarin-Wakker 92)
Event-Smooth Preferences (Machina 04)
CEU (Schmeidler 89)
MEU (Gilboa-Schmeidler 89)
α-MEU (GMM 02, Kopylov 02)
Plausible Priors (Siniscalchi 03)
Simultaneous EU (Nehring 91, 00)
Prob. Soph. Machina-Schmeidler (92) Subjective EU (Savage 54)
Table 1: Two-Way Classiﬁcation of Preference Models
6. UTILITY SOPHISTICATION DE-RELATIVIZED
Utility Sophistication has been deﬁn e dr e l a t i v et oa ne x o g e n o u s l ys p e c i ﬁed set of
likelihood comparisons D. A priori, it is quite possible, however, that a DM may be
utility-sophisticated relative to a non-exhaustive likelihood relation D0 while at the
same time failing to be utility-sophisticated relative to a richer, apparently equally
28This claim would appear to be robust to the particular formalization of event-smoothness
adopted. Epstein (1999) and Machina (2004) deﬁne event-smoothness relative to an additive refer-
ence measure; in the present setting, it would be natural to use the sub-additive upper-probability
π
+
AA for this purpose.
32appropriate belief relation D. Indeed, this possibility arises trivially in the case of
the “vacuous relation” D0=D∅ given by A D∅ B iﬀ A ⊇ B. For a richer example,
consider CEU preferences % that are SEU on unambiguous acts but not globally, and
that are strongly compatible with respect to some equidivisible context D.T h e n% is
utility-sophisticated relative to the restriction D0 of D to unambiguous events, but,
in view of Proposition 5, % cannot be utility-sophisticated with respect to D itself.
Such examples may create the impression that one needs to know his “true,” ex-
haustively described beliefs D> in order to meaningfully ascertain whether a decision
maker is genuinely utility-sophisticated. This would raise obvious conceptual and/or
pragmatic issues, especially in view of the fact that there is no generally accepted
notion of how to infer these beliefs from his preferences, and would thus seriously
threaten the applicability of the entire notion of utility sophistication.
Importantly, however, the problem does not arise when the set of non-exhaustively
ascribed beliefs D0 is suﬃciently rich, speciﬁcally: when it is equidivisible, for example
when D0 is the AA context. Suppose that preferences are utility-sophisticated with
respect to DAA, and consider any superrelation D⊇DAA that is consistent with the
decision-maker’s preferences in that % is strongly compatible with D. We will show
that preferences must then be utility-sophisticated not just with respect to D0=DAA,
but with respect to D, whatever D m a yb e ! I nt h el a n g u a g eo f“ t r u eb e l i e f s ” ,t h i s
means that if it is known that the decision maker’s true beliefs D> c o n t a i na ne q u i d i -
visible likelihood relation D0, it suﬃces to check for utility sophistication with respect
to D0 to determine whether the decision maker is utility-sophisticated with respect
to the true beliefs D>. This is established by the following result.
Proposition 6 i) Suppose % is trade-oﬀ consistent with respect to the equidivisible
context D0 and strongly compatible with D⊇D0.T h e n% is trade-oﬀ consistent with
respect to D as well.
ii) Suppose % is regular and utility-sophisticated with respect to the equidivisible
33context D0 a n ds t r o n g l yc o m p a t i b l ew i t hD⊇D0.T h e n % is regular and utility-
sophisticated with respect to D as well.
A Fully Behavioral Deﬁnition of Utility Sophistication
While Proposition 6 successfully dispenses with the need to identify the decision
maker’s true beliefs, it still leaves utility sophistication relative to the belief context
D0 . Is it possible to overcome this belief-relativity completely and provide a useful
notion of “revealed utility sophistication” that is well-deﬁned in terms of preferences
alone? More speciﬁcally, is it possible to ascertain in terms of preferences alone
whether a decision maker behaves in accordance with the Bernoulli principle?
What is sought is a behavioral deﬁnition roughly on par with the deﬁnition of prob-
abilistic sophistication as a behavioral criterion of satisfaction of the Bayes principle.
The following example — discussed before in Epstein-Zhang (2001) and Ghirardato-
Marinacci (2002) — shows that satisfaction of the Bernoulli principle cannot always
be inferred unambiguously from observed behavior, hence that one cannot hope to
arrive at a satisfactory deﬁnition of revealed utility sophistication that is decisive in
all cases.
Example 3 (Probabilistic Sophistication or Utility Sophistication?) Let
µ be a convex-ranged probability measure on some event space (Ω,Σ), and φ :[ 0 ,1] →
[0,1] an increasing, strictly convex function mapping the unit interval onto itself. Sup-
pose that preferences have a CEU representation with capacity φ ◦ µ, and are thus
probabilistically sophisticated in the sense of Machina-Schmeidler (1992). One nat-
ural explanation of these preferences is that the DM has probabilistic beliefs given by
µ (in line with the Bayes principle) and is “probabilistically risk-averse”. However,
there is a competing explanation, namely that the decision-maker behaves according
34to the Bernouilli priniciple but is ambiguity-averse, evaluating acts according to the
minimum expected utility of the core of the capacity ν, Ξ = {π : π ≥ ν}29;s u c hp r e f -
erences are utility-sophisticated relative to any Π ⊇ Ξ. There seems to be no basis
for privileging one explanation over the other on the basis of preferences alone. At
most, one could argue in favor of a “convention” by postulating the primacy of one
criterion over the other a priori, for example by declaring probabilistic sophistication
to reveal absence of ambiguity by deﬁnition.30
A key feature of Example 3 is sparseness of the beliefs relative to which utility
sophistication can be attributed. But as Proposition 6 has just shown, the illus-
trated conﬂict could not arise if the decision maker was utility-sophisticated relative
to a suﬃciently rich (equidivisible) likelihood relation. In addition, richness in the
form of equidivisibility of beliefs is crucial for the full analytical power of utility so-
phistication due to the entailed reduction property asserted by the main result of
the paper, Theorem 1. Indeed, this reduction property entails that multi-act pref-
erences can be fully explained as utility-sophisticated evaluation determined by risk-
and betting-preferences. Preferences are, one might say, as utility-sophisticated as
they can possibly be; any remaining gap to SEU is fully accounted for by the ambigu-
ity revealed in betting preferences. The crucial role of the richness of the underlying
belief context motivates the following deﬁnition of “revealed utility sophistication”.
Deﬁnition 2 (Revealed Utility Sophistication) The preference relation % is re-
29The capacity ν is easily seen to be convex; the existence of an equivalent MEU representation
follows therefore from a result by Schmeidler (1989).
30This seems to be the line taken by Epstein-Zhang (2001). Ghirardato-Marinacci (2002), on the
other hand, argue for the convention aligned with the second interpretation, explaining very clearly
the unavoidability of a conventional element in the absence of non-behavioral information. They also
point out how the existence of exogeneously identiﬁed unambiguous events allows one to distinguish
between the two possible interpretations of a probabilistically sophisticated DM.
35vealed utility-sophisticated if it is utility-sophisticated relative to some equidivisible
context D .
If preferences satisfy Revealed Utility Sophistication, this can be taken to indicate
satisfaction of the Bernoulli principle. By contrast, if preferences violate this con-
dition, this may be due either to a genuine violation of the Bernoulli principle, or
to insuﬃciently rich beliefs, or both. As there is evidently a provisional element in
the proposed deﬁnition in that equidivisibility is merely suﬃcient, but not strictly
necessary to obtain the conclusions of Theorem 1 and Proposition 6; improvements of
the deﬁnition by weakenings of the equidivisibility assumption are thus imaginable.
To make the proposed deﬁnition applicable, an operational criterion of its satis-
faction is highly desirable. We will now provide such a criterion for the special case
of stake-independent preferences. The assumption of stake-independence is helpful
since it can be shown to imply the existence of a unique maximal likelihood relation
%∗
bet relative to which a given preference ordering is utility-sophisticated;31 from this
one immediately the equivalence of revealed utility sophistication to equidivisibility
of the relation %∗
bet.
For preparation, a bit of further background is needed. If preferences are P4, then
in order to be utility-sophisticated relative to an equidivisible context, they must be
constant-linear in view of Theorem 2 . If they are indeed constant-linear, the ex-
istence of such a context can be determined via the following notion of a maximal
independent subrelation %∗ of the given preference relation %.D e ﬁne the following
mixture-operation αf ⊕ (1 − α)g on the space of acts: for α ∈ [0,1],α f⊕ (1 − α)g
denotes any act h such that, for all ω ∈ Ω,u (hω)=αu(fω)+(1−α)u(gω); note that by
Eventwise Monotonicity the choice of the act h is immaterial. Since utility functions in
a constant-linear representation are unique up to positive aﬃne transformation, this
31While we believe the provided criterion to be applicable also in the stake-dependent case, this
needs to be veriﬁed in future research.
36mixture-operation is well-deﬁned in terms of preferences; Ghirardato et al. (2003) pro-
vide a directly behavioral deﬁnition. A (possibly incomplete) relation %0 is indepen-
dent if, for all f,g,h and α ∈ (0,1],f%0 g if and only if αf⊕(1−α)h %0 αg⊕(1−α)h.
In Nehring (2001), we have obtained (a version of) the following result, a version of
which can also be found in Ghirardato et al. (2004, Propositions 4 and 5).32 The
step from i) to ii) follows from Bewley’s (1986) Theorem.
Proposition 7 Suppose that the preference ordering % has a constant-linear repre-
sentation I ◦ u such that u(X) is convex.
i) Then there exists a unique maximal independent subrelation %∗, with
f %
∗ g i fa n do n l yf o ra l lh and all α ∈ (0,1],α f⊕ (1 − α)h % αg ⊕ (1 − α)h.
ii) There exists a unique closed, convex set of priors Π∗ such that
f %
∗ g if and only Eπu ◦ f ≥ Eπu ◦ g for all π ∈ Π
∗. (5)
In particular, Π∗ is the unique minimal set of closed, convex of priors Π such that %
is utility-sophisticated with respect to Π and u.
Furthermore, %∗
bet is the unique maximal coherent likelihood relation D such that
% is utility-sophisticated with respect to D and u.33
Proposition 7 entails the following operational characterization of revealed utility
sophistication.
32A ﬁrst version of this result was presented in the talk Nehring (1996) which made use of a
diﬀerent version of condition i); the exact version of the characterization of %∗ in i) was arrived at
independently by Ghirardato et al. (2004).
33The last claim has no counterpart in Ghirardato et al. (2004). To verify it, note that %∗
bet=D(Π∗)
by the representation (5). Since by the deﬁnition of coherence for any coherent context D such that
D*%∗
bet, one has ΠD + Π∗ (for otherwise D=D(ΠD)⊆D(Π∗)=%∗
bet), and the claim follows.
37Proposition 8 Suppose that the preference ordering % has a constant-linear repre-
sentation I ◦ u such that u(X) is convex. Then the following three conditions are
equivalent:
1. % is revealed utility-sophisticated;
2. Π∗ is convex-ranged;
3. %∗
bet is equidivisible.
In the case of multi-prior (MEU) preferences with set of priors Ξ, Π∗ is easily veriﬁed
to be equal to Π∗ = Ξ; see Ghirardato et al. (2004, Proposition 16) for a published
proof. Thus the preferences in example 3 are not revealed utility-sophisticated, since
Ξ fails to be convex-ranged there.
7. REVEALED UNAMBIGUOUS BELIEFS
Proposition 8 suggests a natural deﬁnition of “revealed probabilistic beliefs”, namely
%∗
bet. Not only are these beliefs the largest (most precise) likelihood relation that is
consistent with assuming utility sophistication with respect to them, by Proposition
6 it is not possible to impute a strictly larger, more precise likelihood relation relative
with which preferences are at least strongly compatible.34
Deﬁnition 3 (Revealed Probabilistic Beliefs) Suppose that the preference or-
dering % is revealed utility-sophisticated and satisﬁes P4, with constant-linear rep-
resentation I ◦ u such that u(X) is convex. Then %∗
bet deﬁnes the decision maker’s
revealed probabilistic beliefs.
Consider, for example, the counterpart to certainty-independent preferences in the
AA-framework. In view of Proposition 4, such preferences are utility-sophisticated
34These two claims require %∗
bet to be regular.
38with respect to DAA as well as stake-independent. They are thus revealed utility-
sophisticated, with revealed probabilistic beliefs %∗
bet⊇DAA. The existence of an in-
dependent randomization device is thus revealed through preferences rather than
postulated on a non-behavioral basis.
In earlier work (Nehring (1996), see also Nehring (1999) and Nehring (2001)) as well
as in the rich contribution by Ghirardato et al. (2004), analogous deﬁnitions (with
%∗ instead of %∗
bet) have been put forward without restriction to revealed utility-
sophisticated preferences. These earlier deﬁnitions are subject to the criticism that
they somewhat arbitrarily attribute to ambiguity what could be attributed with equal
legitimacy to failures of utility sophistication; in Example 3, for instance, in view
the agent’s “probabilistic sophistication”, a strong case can be made for attributing
complete probabilistic beliefs to the agent. This position is consistent with Deﬁnition
3, since %∗
bet fails to be equidivisible and is therefore not viewed as identifying the
DM’s probabilistic beliefs.
Could one conceive of cases in which the proposed deﬁnition gives a questionable,
or even the intuitively wrong answer? To seriously compete with %∗
bet as a candidate
for belief attribution, such counterexamples would presumably have to exhibit beliefs
D# with which preferences are strongly compatible and which are as rich or “richer”
than %∗
bet. While there is evidently some latitude in determining what should count
as “rich” in this context, an obvious natural candidate is equidivisibility. We have
not yet been able to come up with an example of this kind in which there exists
a competing, equidivisible D# with which % is strongly compatible but not utility-
sophisticated; note in particular that, by Proposition 6, D# can never strictly include
%∗
bet . It seems likely that such examples exist only in exceptional circumstances, if
they exist at all.
Furthermore, even if such examples can be produced, with D# broadly on par with
%∗
bet in terms of its richness as a likelihood relation, there remain strong grounds for
39privileging the %∗
bet as the more compelling representation of the decision maker’s
probabilistic beliefs. First of all, since %∗
bet is the unique maximal relation relative to
which preferences are utility-sophisticated, preferences cannot be utility-sophisticated
relative to D# at the same time. Imputing the beliefs %∗
bet rather than D# thus
renders the decision maker’s behavior overall more rational. And secondly, due to the
reduction property associated with utility sophistication relative to an equidivisible
context, the likelihood relation %∗
bet, together with the revealed utility sophistication,
explains the decision maker’s preferences globally (without gap, as it were), while
D#, tied to preferences merely via Strong Compatibility, constrains and thus explains
preferences only partially.
Restricting the domain of the deﬁnition of revealed probabilistic beliefs as proposed
has signiﬁcant implications for the understanding of some of the major models of
decision making under ambiguity. For example, as noted already, for MEU preferences
with set of priors Ξ, the set of revealed priors given in Proposition 7 is Π∗ = Ξ.
However, examples such as Example 3 interfere with a straightforward interpretation
of this set as the decision maker’s beliefs. Yet such an interpretation constitutes a
large part of the intuitive appeal of the MEU model in the ﬁrst place. Here, the
proposed domain restriction comes to rescue, by salvaging this interpretation for
the case of multi-prior preferences associated with convex-ranged sets of priors Ξ.In
particular, it salvages this interpretation for the original MEU model axiomatized by
Gilboa-Schmeidler (1989) as reformulated here along the lines of section 5.
The proposed domain restriction also aﬀects the analysis of CEU preferences, for
the simple reason that, as evident from Proposition 5, it never applies to them.
Thus, the unqualiﬁed claim in earlier work (Nehring (1999)) that “the” CEU model
suﬀers from serious epistemic handicaps loses its basis. It can only be maintained for
Schmeidler’s (1989) version of the CEU model.
40APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1. That ii) implies i) is straightforward; as to the Archimedean
property, merely note that I−continuity implies an analogous property for decreasing
sequences {An} by switching the roles of x and y.
For the converse, take any g ∈ F. By Eventwise Monotonicity and boundedness,
x− - g - x+. By the convex-rangedness of D, there exists a totally ordered chain
of unambiguous events T ⊆Λ such that, for any T ∈ Λ, there exists T0 ∈ T such
that T0 ≡ T.Hence one can infer from the Archimedeanicity of % (applied to the case
A+B = Ω, i.e. A ∈ Λ)t h ee x i s t e n c eo fa ne v e n tTg ∈ Λ such that g ∼ [x+,T g;x−,Tc
g].
By compatibility, all such events Tg have the same unambiguous probability π(Tg).
Hence the mapping V : g → π(Tg) is well-deﬁned and represents % by construction.
For any consequence/constant act z, set u(z): =π(Tz). By Eventwise Monotonicity,
V can be written as I ◦ u, with I monotone and compatible with D;n o t et h a tI is
normalized by construction; moreover, the uniqueness claim is straightforward from
Solvability which implies that u is onto.
It remains to verify that I is event-continuous. To do so, consider {An ∈ ΛE} and
A ∈ ΛE such that π(An/E) converges to π(A/E) and such that the family is {An}∪A
is ordered by set-inclusion. Take any x,y ∈ X and Z ∈ Z. W.l.o.g. x ≥ y. It clearly
suﬃces to show convergence of I(x1An + y1E\An + Z1Ec)f o rt h ec a s eo f{An} being
an increasing or decreasing sequence. The proof for both cases is analogous; assume
the former, and suppose that the claim is false. I.e., in view of the monotonicity
of I, suppose that supn∈N I(x1An + y1E\An + Z1Ec) <I (x1A + y1E\A + Z1Ec). By
normalization, there exist an event T ∈ Λ such that supn∈N I(x1An+y1E\An+Z1Ec) <
I(1T) <I (x1A + y1E\A + Z1Ec). Hence, by Archimedeanicity, there exist A0 ∈ ΛE
and A0 C A such that I(1T) <I (x1A0 + y1E\A0 + Z1Ec). But by the convergence
assumption, A0 E An for some n, hence I(x1A0 + y1E\A0 + Z1Ec) ≤ supn∈N I(x1An +
41y1E\An + Z1Ec) <I(1T), a contradiction. ¤
In the following Lemma, we state a key mathematical property of the intrinsic
integral b ρ that will be used repeatedly in the sequel. Let S denote any ﬁnite partition
of Ω into events Si ∈ Σ.S a yt h a tZ ∈ Z is D-unambiguous conditional on the ﬁnite
partition S if, for all Si ∈ S,Z 1Si is ΛSi-measurable; let ZS denote their class. For





0 ∈ Si | Z (ω
0)=z}/Si)i fω ∈ Si and Si is non-null, and
ζ (ω)=a r b i t r a r y i f ω ∈ Si and Si is null;
l e tt h es e to fs u c hζ be denoted by E(Z/S).
Lemma 1 (Characterization of Intrinsic Integral) b ρ is the unique mapping r :
Z → [0,1] such that
i) For any event A ∈ Σ,r(1A)=ρ(A), and
ii) (Conditional Linearity) For any partition S and any Z ∈ ZS,r(Z)=r(ζ)
for any ζ ∈ E(Z/S).
Note that Conditional Linearity implies in particular that b ρ restricted to unambigu-
ous random variables is the ordinary expectation with respect to π or equivalently
ρ.
Proof of Lemma 1.
It is immediate from its deﬁnition that b ρ satisﬁes i). To verify the Conditional
Linearity of b ρ, write Z as
P
i,j zij1Aij with Si =
P
j≤nj Aij for all i. Consider any
C such that π(C ∩ Aij)=zijπ(Aij) for all i,j and all π ∈ Π;s u c hC exist by the
convex-rangedness of Π.T h e nC ∈ [Z] by construction and fact, for all non-null Si














42From this evidently C ∈ [ζ] for any ζ ∈ E(Z/S). Thus indeed C ∈ [Z] ∩ [ζ], and
therefore
b ρ(Z)=ρ(C)=b ρ(ζ).
Conversely, assume that r satisﬁes i) and ii). Consider any Z=
P
i zi1Si and any
C ∈ [Z]s u c ht h a tπ (C ∩ Si)=ziπ(Si) for all i,j and all π ∈ Π;s u c hC exist by the
convex-rangedness of Π. By construction of C, 1C ∈ ZS with Z ∈ E(1C/S). Hence
r(Z)=r(1C) (by ii) = ρ(C)( b y i )= b ρ(Z),
which establishes that r = b ρ. ¤
Proof of Theorem 1.
iii) implies ii) To show that % is utility-sophisticated with respect to D,t a k ea n y
f,g such that Eπu ◦ f ≥ Eπu ◦ g for all π ∈ Π, and take A ∈ [u ◦ f]a n dB ∈ [u ◦ g].
By construction, π(A) ≥ π(B)f o ra l lπ ∈ Π, and therefore by the compatibility of ρ
b ρ(u ◦ f)=ρ(A) ≥ ρ(B)=b ρ(u ◦ g),
i.e. f % g. B yt h es a m et o k e n ,i fEπu ◦ f>E πu ◦ g for all π ∈ Π, then f Â g.
To verify that % is Archimedean, in view of Proposition 1 we need to verify that b ρ is
event-continuous exploiting the event-continuity of ρ.T h u s ,t a k es o m ex,y ∈ X , Z ∈
Z, E ∈ Σ,A∈ ΛE and some increasing sequence {An} of events contained in A such
that π(An/E) converges to π(A/E); we need to show that b ρ(x1An +y1E\An +Z1Ec)
converges to b ρ(x1A + y1E\A + Z1Ec). By conditional linearity (Lemma 1),
b ρ(x1A + y1E\A + Z1Ec)=b ρ((π(A/E)x +( 1− π(A/E))y)1 E + Z1Ec)
and likewise
b ρ(x1An + y1E\An + Z1Ec)=b ρ((π(An/E)x +( 1− π(An/E))y)1 E + Z1Ec).
Suppose x ≥ y; the converse case is dealt with symmetrically.
43Take B ∈ [Z1Ec],A 0 ∈ [(π(A/E)x +( 1− π(A/E))y)1 E] and an increasing se-
quence of events A0
n ∈ [(π(An/E)x +( 1− π(An/E))y)1 E]c o n t a i n e di nA0. By con-
struction,
b ρ((π(A/E)x +( 1− π(A/E))y)1 E + Z1Ec)=ρ(A
0 + B),
as well as
b ρ((π(An/E)x +( 1− π (An/E))y)1 E + Z1Ec)=ρ(A
0
n + B)
Note that by deﬁnition, A0 and the A0
n are unambiguous given E. Hence by the
event-continuity of ρ, ρ(A0 + B) = limn→∞ ρ(A0
n + B), and therefore
b ρ(x1A + y1E\A + Z1Ec) = lim
n→∞ b ρ(x1An + y1E\An + Z1Ec),
as needed to be shown.
ii) implies i) It is clear that Utility Sophistication implies Compatibility. To
verify Trade-oﬀ Consistency, take any x,y,x0,y0 ∈ X,f,g ∈ F and events A disjoint
from B and A0 disjoint from B0 such that A ≡ B BB ∅ and A0 ≡ B0 and such
that [x on A;y on B;f(ω)e l s e w h e r e ]% [x0 on A;y0 on B;f(ω)e l s e w h e r e ] . By the
assumption on A and B, for all π ∈ Π,π(A)=π(B) > 0; therefore, if it was the case
that u(x)+u(y) <u (x0)+u(y0), then the strict part of Utility Sophistication would
imply that [x on A;y on B;f(ω)e l s e w h e r e ]≺ [x0 on A;y0 on B;f(ω)e l s e w h e r e ] ,
which is false by assumption. Thus u(x)+u(y) ≥ u(x0)+u(y0), which implies by the
non-strict part of Utility Sophistication that [x on A0;y on B0;g(ω)e l s e w h e r e ]% [x0
on A0;y0 on B0;g(ω)e l s e w h e r e ] , as needed to be shown.
i) implies iii)
Since Trade-oﬀ Consistency implies Eventwise Monotonicity for equidivisible con-
texts as remarked in the text, by Proposition 1 there exist an onto function u : X →
44[0,1] and a normalized functional I : Z → [0,1] that is monotone, event-continuous
and compatible with D such that f % g if and only if I(u ◦ f) ≥ I(u ◦ g), for all
f,g ∈ F.I n p a r t i c u l a r , ρ is event-continuous as the restriction of I to indicator
functions. It remains to show that I = b ρ.
Step 1. We shall ﬁrst consider the case of dyadic-valued utilities; a number is dyadic
if α =  
2m, where m is natural or zero, and   is an odd integer or zero; m will be referred
to as the (dyadic) order of α denoted by |α|.L e tD denote the set of dyadic numbers
in (0,1].
Lemma 2 For any α ∈ D,w,x,y ∈ X,B ∈ Σ,A∈ ΛB with A ⊆ B and T ∈ Λ
such that π(T)=π(A/B)=α : if w ∼ [x,T;y,Tc], then [w,B;f(ω) elsewhere] ∼
[x,A;y,B\A;f(ω) elsewhere].
The Lemma is proved by induction on the order of α. If the order of α is 1, i.e. if
α = 1
2, the assertion follows directly from Trade-oﬀ Consistency. Suppose thus that
the Lemma has been shown for all dyadic coeﬃcient α0 with |α0| < |α|. Assume that
α ≥ 1
2;t h ec a s eo fα<1
2 c a nb ep r o v e de s s e n t i a l l yi d e n t i c a l l y . T h e nα = 1
2 + 1
2β,
where β is dyadic with |β| = |α| − 1.
Now deﬁne unambiguous events T1,T 2,T 3 such that T1 +T2 +T3 = Ω,T 2 +T3 = T,
and π(T2)=1
2β. Since π(T)=α, one has also π(T3)=1
2 and π(T2/T1 + T2)=β. In
parallel, deﬁne events A1,A 2,A 3 ∈ ΛB such that A1+A2+A3 = B,A2+A3 = A, and
π(A2/B)=1
2β.S i n c eπ(A/B)=α, one has also π(A3/B)=1
2 and π(A2/A1 +A2)=
β. Such events exist by the convex-rangedness of Π.
Take any D ∈ Λ such that π(D)=β, and z ∈ X such that z ∼ [x,D;y,Dc]; such
z exists by Solvability. Since π(T2/T1 + T2)=β, by the induction assumption this
implies that
[z,T1 + T2;x,T3] ∼ [y,T1;x,T2;x,T3],
45hence by the assumption that w ∼ [x,T;y,Tc] and transitivity also that
[z,T1 + T2;x,T3] ∼ [w,T1 + T2;w,T3]. (6)
Writing [x,A;y,B\A;f(ω)e l s e w h e r e ]=[ y,A1;x,A2;x,A3;f(ω)e l s e w h e r e ] , by the
induction assumption one also has
[x,A;y,B\A;f(ω)e l s e w h e r e ]∼ [z,A1 + A2;x,A3;f(ω)e l s e w h e r e ] .
By Trade-oﬀ Consistency and (6), in turn
[z,A1 + A2;x,A3;f(ω)e l s e w h e r e ]∼ [w,A1 + A2;w,A3;f(ω)e l s e w h e r e ] .
Since B = A1 + A2 + A3, we get by transitivity
[x,A;y,B\A;f(ω)e l s e w h e r e ]∼ [w,B;f(ω)e l s e w h e r e ]
as desired.
Step 2. We shall next obtain the desired conclusion for the subset dyadic-valued
functions Y ∈ Z, which we shall abbreviate to ZD.T h u s ,t a k ea n yY =
P
i≤n yi1Ei ∈
ZD; by solvability, there exists f =[ wi,E i]i≤n ∈ F such that u(wi)=yi for all i,s o
that Y = u◦f. For each i ≤ n, pick Ai ⊆ Ei such that π(Ai/Ei )=u(wi). By n−fold










i≤n Ai ∈ [Y ]
by construction, one obtains




demonstrating that I = b ρ on ZD.
Step 3.
This conclusion is extended to all of Z by an inductive continuity argument. Let
Zk the set of random variables Y ∈ Z such that in their canonical representation
46Y =
P
i≤n yi1Ei no more than ky i’s are not dyadic. Step 2 has established that I = b ρ
on ZD = Z0. Suppose therefore that I = b ρ on Zk; we need to show that I = b ρ on
Zk+1.T a k eY =
P
i≤n yi1Ei ∈ Zk+1, and assume w.l.o.g. that y1 ∈ (0,1]\D.





A ∈ [y11E1] and an increasing sequence {Aj} contained in A such that Aj ∈ [vj1E1];
such events exist by repeated applications of equidivisibility. Denote Yj := vj1E1 +
P
2≤i≤n yi1Ei. Note that by construction, Aj + B ∈ [Yj]a n dA + B ∈ [Y ]. By the
event-continuity of ρ, limj→∞ ρ(Aj + B)=ρ(A + B), and therefore
lim
j→∞
b ρ(Yj)=l i m
j→∞
ρ(Aj + B)=ρ(A + B)=b ρ(Y ).
Likewise, take a decreasing sequence {v0














= b ρ(Y ).
By the induction assumption, for all j,













Hence, by the monotonicity of I,
b ρ(Y )=l i m
j→∞
b ρ(Yj) = lim
j→∞
















= b ρ(Y ),
which yields
b ρ(Y )=I(Y )
as desired. ¤
47Proof of Theorem 2.
Step 1. constant-linearity of b ρ implies P4.
Take any A,B ∈ Σ such that ρ(A) ≥ ρ(B), and any x,y ∈ X with u(y) <u (x). In
view of Theorem 1, it suﬃces to show that b ρ(u ◦ [x,A;y,Ac]) ≥ b ρ(u ◦ [x,B;y,Bc]).
Indeed, this follows easily from the equalities
u ◦ [x,A;y,A
c]=u(x)1A + u(y)1Ac =( u(x) − u(y))1A + u(y)1Ω,
whence by constant-linearity
b ρ(u ◦ [x,A;y,A
c]) = (u(x) − u(y))ρ(A)+u(y),
and similarly
b ρ(u ◦ [x,B;y,B
c]) = (u(x) − u(y))ρ(B)+u(y),
from which the desired conclusion follows immediately.
Step 2. P4 implies Union and Splitting Invariance.
Consider any A ∈ Σ , α,β ∈ [0,1] such that α + β ≤ 1, and A0 ∈ ΛA as well
as B1 ∈ ΛA and B2 ∈ ΛAc (both disjoint from A0) such that π(A0/A)=α and
π(B1/A)=π(B2/Ac)=β, and let B = B1 + B2.
Claim: ρ(A0 + B)=αρ(A)+β.
Pick consequences y,x such that u(y)=β and u(x)=α+β. By utility sophistica-



























One computes b ρ(u ◦ [x,T;y,Tc]) = Eπ (u ◦ [x,T;y,Tc]) = (α + β)π(T)+βπ0 (Tc)=
αρ(A)+β, whence
ρ(A
0 + B)=b ρ(1A0+B)=b ρ(u ◦ [x,T;y,T
c]) = αρ(A)+β,
verifying the claim.
Specialized to the case β =0 , the Claim clearly entails Splitting Invariance.
To obtain Union Invariance, choose any A ∈ Σ and C ∈ Λ disjoint from A.I t
clearly suﬃces to show that ρ(A + C)=ρ(A)+ρ(C).
Take any A0 ∈ ΛA such that π(A0/A)=1
2 and any C0 ∈ ΛC such that π(C0/C)=1
2.
Clearly, C0 ∈ Λ and A0 + C0 ∈ ΛA+C with π(A0 + C0/A + C)=1







(ρ(A + C)). (7)
Now choose B1 ∈ ΛA and B2 ∈ ΛAc (both disjoint from A0)s u c ht h a tπ(B1/A)=
π(B2/Ac)=1
2ρ(C). Evidently, B = B1 + B2 ∈ Λ with π(B)=π(C0)=1
2ρ(C). It is




0 + B). (8)
Since 1
2 + 1









Combining equations (7), (8), and (9) yields the desired result.
49Step 3a) Union Invariance implies constant-additivity.
Take any Y =
P
i∈I yi1Ei and c ∈ [0,1] such that Y +c1Ω ∈ Z. Since Y ≤ (1−c)1Ω,
there exist A ∈ [Y ]a n dS,T ∈ Λ such that ρ(S)=ρ(A) ≤ 1 − c, ρ(T)=c, and T
is disjoint from both A and S. To see this, take A =
P
i∈I Ai with Ai ∈ ΛEi and
π(Ai/Ei)=yi,S=
P
i∈I Si with Si ∈ ΛEi and π(Si/Ei)=ρ(A), and T =
P
i∈I Ti
with Ti ∈ ΛEi and π(Ti/Ei)=c such that Ti is disjoint from both Ai and Si, for
all i ∈ I;s u c hAi,S i, and Ti exist by the convex-rangedness of Π. Clearly, A + T ∈
[Y +c1Ω]. Since A ∼bet S by assumption, A+T ∼bet S+T by Union Invariance which
in turn is tantamount to
ρ(A + T)=ρ(S + T)=ρ(S)+ρ(T)=ρ(A)+c.
Hence
b ρ(Y + c1Ω)=ρ(A + T)=ρ(A)+c = b ρ(Y )+c.
Step 3b) Splitting Invariance implies positive homogeneity
Take Y ∈ Z and rational c = m
n ≤ 1, where m and n are natural numbers. Take
A ∈ [Y ]a n dT ∈ Λ such that π(T)=b ρ(Y ). By equidivisibility of D /convex-
rangedness of Π, there exist partitions of A and T can be split into n equally likely
subevents {A1,...,An} and {T1,...,T n}; by an argument paralleling that in i), the Ai




nY ]. Since by construction






























which establishes positive homogeneity for rational α. This implies positive homo-
geneity for arbitrary α, since by monotonicity of b ρ,
αb ρ(Y )=s u p {βb ρ(Y ) | β ≤ α,β ∈ Q} =s u p {b ρ(βY) | β ≤ α,β ∈ Q}
≤ b ρ(αY ) ≤ inf{b ρ(βY) | β ≥ α,β ∈ Q} = αb ρ(Y ),
50and thus b ρ(αY )=αb ρ(Y ). ¤
Proof of Proposition 2. The necessity of Union and Splitting Invariance
follows from Theorem 2. The validity of the converse can be seen as follows. First,
applying the proof of Theorem 1 to preferences over unambiguous acts %ua, one infers
that these preferences have a SEU representation with utility function u, unique up to
positive aﬃne transformations. Likewise, applying the proof of Proposition 1, there
exists a unique event-continuous ρ representing %B such that ρ(T)=π(T)f o rT ∈ Λ.
Let b ρ denote the associated expectation operator given by (1). By the proof of the
implication 3)=⇒2) of Theorem 2, b ρ is constant-linear. Deﬁne % by setting for all
f,g ∈ F:
f % g iﬀ b ρ(u ◦ f) ≥ b ρ(u ◦ g). (10)
Clearly, by the implication 1)=⇒3) of Theorem 1, if an extension with the desired
properties exists, it must be given by (10). Conversely, this preference ordering % is
Archimedean and tradeoﬀ-consistent by the implication 3)=⇒1) of Theorem 1. Since
ρ agrees with π on Λ, the restriction of % to Fua agrees with %ua . Furthermore, by
construction %bet=%B.S i n c eb ρ is constant-linear, % satisﬁes P4 by the implication
2)=⇒1) of Theorem 2.
Finally, we need to show that the ordering % given in (10) does not depend on
the context D . That is, take two equidivisible contexts D1 and D2 with associated
Λ1 and Λ2 relative to which %B is Archimedean, compatible and satisﬁes Union-
and Splitting-Invariance, and take preference relations over unambiguous acts %1
ua
and %1
ua with the same associated preferences over lotteries, hence with the same
representing vNM utility function u.L e t %1 and %2 denote the extensions to all
Savage acts given by (10). Then we claim that in fact %1=%2 .
To see this, by Theorem 2, each %i has a constant-linear representation I ◦ u
with u(X)=[ 0 ,1], ensuring applicability of Proposition 7 in section 6 below. For
51i =1 ,2, let %∗i
bet denote associated revealed likelihood relations. Since %i is utility-
sophisticated with respect to the equidivisible context Di by construction and since
%1
bet=%2
bet=%B, by Proposition 7 evidently %∗1
bet=%∗2
bet . For i =1 ,2,3l e tΛi,[.]i,ρ i, b ρi
denote the families of unambiguous events, equivalence class operators, normalized ca-
pacities and intrinsic integrals associated with (%B,D1), (%B,D2), and (%B,%∗1
bet=%∗2
bet
), respectively. By maximality of %∗1
bet and %∗2
bet, evidently Λ3 ⊇ Λ1 ∪ Λ2 and [Z]3 ⊇
[Z]1 ∪ [Z]2 for all Z ∈ Z. Thus, clearly ρ1 = ρ3 = ρ2 and b ρ1 = b ρ3 = b ρ2. By Theorem
1t h e r e f o r e%1=%2 . ¤
Proof of Fact 1.
That ii) implies i) is straightforward.
The converse follows easily from showing that if % is strongly compatible with
ac o m p l e t eD represented by a convex-ranged prior π, then f % g whenever u ◦ f
stochastically dominates u ◦ g.B u t v i e w i n g D as the revealed likelihood relation
associated with %, Strong Compatibility is just Machina-Schmeidler’s (1992) Strong
Comparative Probability axiom, and the present claim is the key step in their proof.
¤
Proof of Proposition 4.
For x ∈ X, let δx denote the lottery putting probability 1 on x;a l s o ,f o rq ∈ L,l e t
E (q)=
P
x∈X xqx. In view of Proposition 1, it is w.l.o.g. to assume that X =[ 0 ,1]
and u(x)=x for all x ∈ X; this simply means that consequences are referred by
the utilities they generate. As a result, acts f ∈ F can be identiﬁed with random
variables Z ∈ Z. If %AA satisﬁes Lottery Independence, then the linearity assumption
on u implies risk-neutrality, i.e., for all q ∈ L,q∼AA δE(q),as i m p l i ﬁcation that will
be used repeatedly in the proofs.
521. Trade-oﬀ Consistency of % implies Monotonicity and Lottery Independence of %AA
Lottery Independence follows immediately from EU maximization over unambigu-
o u sa c t si m p l i e db yT h e o r e m1 . T ov erify Monotonicity, take any act F ∈ FAA,
lotteries p,q ∈ L and event S ∈ Σ1 such that p %AA q. By EU/expected value maxi-
mization over unambiguous acts, p ∼AA δE(p) and q ∼AA δE(q), hence E (p) ≥ E (q).
Let Y and Z be Savage acts such that F(Y )=[ p on S;F(ω)e l s e w h e r e ] ,F (Z)=[ q
on S;F(ω)e l s e w h e r e ] , and Y−S×Ω2 = Z−S×Ω2. By the Conditional Linearity property
of the intrinsic integral (Lemma 1) and Theorem 1, Y ∼ [E (p)o nS × Ω2,Y −S×Ω2]
and Z ∼ [E (q)o nS ×Ω2,Z −S×Ω2]. Since E (p) ≥ E (q), by Eventwise Monotonicity
and transitivity therefore Y % Z, which implies that [p on S;F(ω)e l s e w h e r e ]%AA [q
on S;F(ω)e l s e w h e r e ] , as needs to be shown.
2. Monotonicity and Lottery Independence of %AA imply Trade-oﬀ Consistency of % .
In view of Theorem 1, we need to show that I = b ρ. To do so, we need to show that
for any Z ∈ Z there exists A ∈ [Z]s u c ht h a tZ ∼ 1A and thus I (Z)=ρ(A).
Take any Z ∈ Z and write Z =
P
i≤n,j≤ni zi,j1Si×Ti,j. By convex-rangedness of
η, there exist for each i ≤ n,j ≤ ni events T0
i,j ∈ Σ2 such that T0






= zi,jη(Ti,j). Let A :=
P
i≤n,j≤ni Si × T0
i,j. By construction, for all i,j, A ∩
(Si × Ti,j)=Si × T0
i,j and π(A/Si × Ti,j)=zi,j, whence A ∈ [Z]. Write F(Z)=[ pi
on Si]a n dF(1A)=[ qi on Si].















pi ∼AA qi for all i.
By Monotonicity, this implies
F(Z) ∼AA F(1A),
53which, by the construction of %AA, yields Z ∼ 1A as desired .
3. Trade-oﬀ Consistency and P4 of % imply Certainty Independence of %AA .
Take any AA-acts F =[ pi on Si],G =[ qi on Si], any constant act H =[ q on
Ω1]a n dα ∈ (0,1].
Let Y :=
P
i E (pi)1 Si×Ω2 and Z :=
P
i E (qi)1 Si×Ω2.B yT h e o r e m2 ,b ρ is constant-
linear. Hence by Theorem 1,
Y % Z if and only if αY +( 1− α)E (q) % αZ +( 1− α)E (q). (11)
By the Monotonicity and Lottery Independence (hence risk-neutrality) shown in
part 1),
F ∼AA [δE(pi) on Si]=F(Y ),
G ∼AA [δE(qi) on Si]=F(Z),
αF +( 1− α)H ∼AA [δαE(pi)+(1−α)E(q) on Si]=F(αY +( 1− α)E (q)), and
αG +( 1− α)H ∼AA [δαE(qi)+(1−α)E(q) on Si]=F(αZ +( 1− α)E (q)).
In view of the equivalences established above, this translates back into the desired
conclusion
F %AA G if and only if αF +( 1− α)H %AA αG +( 1− α)H.
4. Monotonicity and Certainty Independence of %AA imply P4 of % .
Since % is trade-oﬀ consistent by part 2), in view Theorems 1 and 2 it suﬃces
to establish the constant-linearity of the intrinsic integral b ρ. Take any Z ∈ Z,a n d
α,c ∈ [0,1] such that α + c ≤ 1; we need to show that b ρ(αZ + c1Ω)=αb ρ(Z)+c in
any such case.
54By deﬁnition of b ρ,
Z ∼ b ρ(Z)1 Ω,
hence
F(Z) ∼AA F(b ρ(Z)1 Ω)=δb ρ(Z).
By Certainty Independence, it follows that
F (αZ + c1Ω)=αF (Z)+( 1− α)δ c
1−α
∼AA αδb ρ(Z) +( 1− α)δ c
1−α
∼AA δαb ρ(Z)+c
= F ((αb ρ(Z)+c)1 Ω),
whence from the deﬁnition of %AA,
αZ + c1Ω∼(αb ρ(Z)+c)1 Ω,
and therefore
b ρ(αZ + c1Ω)=αb ρ(Z)+c
by the normalization of b ρ. ¤
Proof of Proposition 5.
Suppose that a CEU preference ordering % is utility-sophisticated relative to the
equidivisible context D. Since by EU maximization on unambiguous acts, ν = ρ, we
need to show that ρ is additive. Thus, take any disjoint events A,B ∈ Σ as well as
events A0 ⊆ A such that A0 ≡ A\A0 and B0 ⊆ B such that B0 ≡ B\B0.S p e c i f y
consequences in utiles, and, for z ∈ [0,1] let
fz := [1 on B





on B,z on A,0e l s e w h e r e ] .




u ◦ fzdν = ρ(B
0)+z [ρ(A + B
0) − ρ(B
0)],
while, for z ≥ 1
2
Z
u ◦ gzdν = zρ(A)+
1
2
[ρ(A + B) − ρ(A)],
and for z ≤ 1
2
Z
u ◦ gzdν =
1
2
ρ(B)+z [ρ(A + B) − ρ(B)].
Thus,
R
u ◦ fzdν =
R




0)=ρ(A + B) − ρ(B),
i.e. only if ρ(A)+ρ(B)=ρ(A + B), as needed to be shown. ¤.
Proof of Proposition 6.
Part 1). Take any x,y,x0,y0 ∈ X such that x % x0, acts f,g ∈ F and events A
disjoint from B and A0 disjoint from B0 such that A ≡ B BB ∅,A 0 ≡ B0 and
[x on A;y on B;f(ω)e l s e w h e r e ]% [x
0 on A;y
0 on B;f(ω)e l s e w h e r e ] . (12)
By the equidivisibility of D0,t h e r ee x i s te v e n t sA00 disjoint from B00 and A000 disjoint
from B000 such that A00 + B00 = A + B, A000 + B000 = A0 + B0,A 00 ≡0 B00 BB ∅ and
A000 ≡0 B000.
Clearly by coherence and the fact that D⊇D0, A ≡ A00 and B ≡ B00. Therefore by
Strong Compatibility,
[x on A;y on B;f(ω)e l s e w h e r e ]∼ [x on A
00;y on B








00;f(ω)e l s e w h e r e ] . (14)
Combining (12), (13) and (14) by transitivity therefore
[x on A
00;y on B




00;f(ω)e l s e w h e r e ] . (15)
By Trade-oﬀ Consistency with respect to D0 thus
[x on A
000;y on B




000;f(ω)e l s e w h e r e ] . (16)
B yt h es a m et o k e na sa b o v e ,A0 ≡ A000 and B0 ≡ B000,a n dt h e r e f o r e
[x on A
000;y on B
000;f(ω)e l s e w h e r e ]∼ [x on A
0;y on B










0;f(ω)e l s e w h e r e ] . (18)
Combining (16), (17) and (18) by transitivity therefore
[x on A
0;y on B




0;f(ω)e l s e w h e r e ] ( 1 9 )
as desired.
Part 2). Suppose % is utility-sophisticated, Archimedean, bounded, solvable with
respect to the equidivisible D context that contains D0 . Clearly, % is also Archimedean
with respect to D,s i n c eBB contains BB0; likewise, % is solvable with respect to D .
By Theorem 1 (2=⇒1), preferences are trade-oﬀ consistent with respect to D0.S i n c e
they are strongly compatible with D by assumption, they are also trade-oﬀ consis-
tent with respect to D by part 1) . By Theorem 1 again (1=⇒2), preferences are
utility-sophisticated with respect to D . ¤
57Proof of Proposition 8.
The equivalence of (1) and (2) is immediate from Proposition 7. The equivalence
of (2) and (3) follows from the fact that Π(%∗
bet) = Π∗, w h i c hi nt u r nf o l l o w sf r o mt h e
uniqueness of the multi-representation of equidivisible likelihood relations shown in
Nehring (2006, Theorem 2).
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